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Introduction
It is widely recognized in the economic literature that women suffer wage discrimination.
The unexplained gender wage gap consists in the discrepancy between what females
would earn with male characteristics and what women actually earn.
Gary Becker (1957) started the economic analysis of labour market discrimina-
tion. He developed the idea that employers and costumers may have prejudices against
members of particular (minority) groups and introduced the concept of tastes for dis-
crimination. These discriminatory tastes influence the behaviour of people and have
an impact on earnings and employment chances of the discriminated group.
Common to the discrimination studies is the comparison between the income mea-
sures of employees in a protected class and those of employees not in the class, to
detect potential discrimination. In our case, the protected group refers to males. Most
of the existing studies are based on a sample of male and female workers and attempt
to explain their wages by their observable characteristics, such as accumulated human
capital (years of schooling and years of work experience, for instance) and other factors
believed to influence wages, such as marital status and labour supply. The remaining
portion of the wage gap is then often attributed to employer discrimination.
One natural candidate to explain at least part of the unobserved difference in wages
across gender is occupational segregation. Researchers usually distinguish between
labour supply and labour demand factors when explaining occupational segregation
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by gender. Factors related to labour supply generally focus on why women “prefer”
certain types of occupation (for example, women may prefer works with flexible hours
in order to allow time for child care). Explanations related to labour demand focus on
why employers generally “prefer” to hire women or men for particular occupations, and
why women and men have different opportunities for promotion and career development
within firms.
In chapter 1, I present a detailed review of the literature on gender wage gap
measurement and I highlight the contributions of my work. The main part of the
thesis consists of Chapters 2 and 3.
In chapter 2, we are interested in the analysis of horizontal occupational segregation
by gender in Switzerland. We try to answer the following questions: Does segregation
arise because “female” occupations have financial advantages for women planning to
spend some time as homemakers, as human-capital theory claims? Do “male” occupa-
tions have more onerous working conditions that explain their higher earnings, as the
neoclassical notion of “compensating differentials” suggests? To answer these questions
we use a cross-sectional survey in year 2000. We extend the linear model by introducing
a new variable, FEM , which represents the percentage of the female labour force em-
ployed in an occupation. This new variable is included in order to explain the impact
of the density of females in a certain occupation on individual wages (see England et
al. 1988, Sorensen 1990 for similar studies).
In chapter 3 we try to give some answers to an interesting question concerning the
vertical occupational segregation: Are women more segregated into lower level of the
occupational hierarchy? To answer this question, we use a binomial Probit model with
random effects to predict the career stages and the earnings of men and women with
a panel data, for a period of 5 years (1999-2003), using data from the Enqueˆte Suisse
sur la Popolation Active.
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Chapter 1
A discrimination measurement
1.1 Introduction
In the first part of this chapter I present an overview on the labour economics literature
and on econometric models to detect wage discrimination. In particular, I first briefly
review the literature from Becker (1957) to Oaxaca (1973), analysing the different
economic models. I then present a different approach used by Polachek and Kim (1994)
and developed by others economists, namely panel data methods. In the second part of
this chapter, I expose the purpose of my analysis, and finally in the last part I describe
the data used in my analysis.
1.2 Reviewing the literature
The most used approach in measuring the extent of gender wage discrimination is
based on the human capital theory of wage determination. According to human capital
theory, wages depend on the productivity of the individual. In a non-discriminatory
environment, the observed male-female wage differentials should be due to differences
in productivity between men and women only. Gender wage discrimination takes place
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when equally productive workers are paid different wages. In other words, when there
is discrimination, male-female wage differentials cannot be explained only in terms
of differences in productivity. In empirical analysis, productivity is not observed by
researchers and thus measures of discrimination are usually adjusted for all observable
characteristics that might be expected to affect productivity.
The findings of several empirical studies point out that part of wage differential is
due to differences in objective characteristics such as education and work experience,
while a part remains even when male-female differences in these traits are controlled
for. However, the quantitative dimensions of the various causes of unequal wages are
not well known.
Gary Becker (1957) was the first to analyse economically the labour market dis-
crimination. He developed the idea that employers and customers may have prejudices
against members of particular (minority) groups and introduced the term of tastes for
discrimination. These discriminatory tastes influence the behaviour of people; they
do have an impact on earnings and employment chances of the discriminated group.
The discrimination coefficient captures costs associated with discriminatory tastes, and
suggests that employers with discriminatory tastes are willing to trade reduced profits
for fewer minority employees. The way that minority and nonminority workers enter
into the production function, and the way they enter in to the utility function, will
obviously have implications on the interpretation of the resulting wage differentials.
For simplicity, it is assumed that male labour and female labour are perfect substi-
tutes. That is, men and women are equally productive and thus they deserve an equal
wage in absence of discrimination. However discriminatory tastes may exist among
employers, co-workers and/or customers.
Employers with tastes for discrimination against women will hire women workers
only at a wage discount that is sufficiently large to compensate them for the disutility
6
of employing women. Becker (1957) also showed that even if employers themselves have
no tastes for discrimination against women, profit-maximizing behaviour by employ-
ers may result in gender discrimination if the employees or the customers have such
discriminatory tastes. Indeed, male employees with tastes for discrimination against
women will work with them only at a wage premium that is sufficient to compensate
them for the disutility of female co-workers. Similarly, customers with tastes for dis-
crimination against women will buy products and services produced or sold by women
only at a lower price. Intuitively, we would expect this type of discrimination to be
more important in sales or service occupation where face-to-face contact with the cus-
tomer occurs. As a consequence of co-worker or customer discrimination, employers
may, in certain circumstances, discount female wages to compensate for the higher costs
or lower revenues they attend in employing women.
The basic idea stated by Becker (1957) is that market discrimination is defined by
a comparison of the wage rates of two groups, f and m, as they are actually observed,
and as they would be observed in the absence of discrimination. For example, if f
and m are perfect substitutes in production, in the absence of discrimination f and m
would have the same wage rates. In this case, the difference between the wage of the
two groups f and m would be a measure of discrimination.
More generally, if the observed wages of groups f and m are pif and pim respectively,
and if they would be pi0f and pi
0
m in the absence of discrimination, then the percentage
market discrimination against group f is
D =
[
pim
pif
− pi
0
m
pi0f
]
/
pi0m
pi0f
(1.1)
D is the percentage due to discrimination.
Continuing discrimination can also be due to certain beliefs of employers regarding
the productivity of particular groups. The theory of statistical discrimination argues
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that hiring or promoting decisions may not only be based on information about skills
and qualification. Employers, who are not assumed to have a taste for discrimination,
may also use easily observable characteristics like race or gender (Arrow, 1972). Such
behaviour is clearly discriminatory but has even more serious consequences if discrim-
inated people react in the expected way, i.e. do quit jobs more often and becomes less
productive. Discrimination persists since employers are confirmed of their expectations
and see no need to change then (Blau, Ferber, and Winkler, 1998; Becker 1992).
After Becker, Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) were among the first economists to
treat the problem of wage discrimination from an econometric point of view. Over the
last 30 years, the approach to explain wage differentials introduced into the literature
by these two researchers has been intensively used and further developed.
Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973) suggest that the average wages of two groups
(which can be distinguished by gender, race, country of origin and others) can be
decomposed into two parts. The first part is due to differences in the observable char-
acteristics that measure both productivity (skill) and endowment. The second part is
due to the different treatment of the two groups in the labour market (what is often
referred to as the discrimination component). In this analysis I refer to the group
with the greater mean wage (conditional on the observable individual characteristics)
as advantaged (a) and the other group as disadvantaged (d).
The decomposition of wage differences was construct by using the measure of dis-
crimination, introduced by Becker (1971), defined as the difference between the ob-
served wage ratio and the wage ratio that would prevail in the absence of discrimination.
From equation (1.1), we have(
pia
pid
)
=
(
pi0a
pi0d
)
(1.2)
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in the absence of discrimination (D = 0)1. Oaxaca (1973), and then Cotton (1988),
expressed the formulation given in (1.1) in logarithmic form as
lnpia − lnpid = lnpi0a − lnpi0d + ln(D + 1) (1.3)
where the first term on the right hand side (the difference in the logs of the marginal
productivities) is due to differences in productivity of the two groups and the second
term on the right hand side ln(D+ 1) is due to discrimination. Oaxaca (1973) showed
that, since regression lines must pass through the variables’ means, separate linear
models of the log wage specification can be estimated for the disadvantaged group
ln(pid) = X¯ ′dβ̂d, (1.4)
and for the advantaged group with
ln(pia) = X¯ ′aβ̂a. (1.5)
The formulation given in (1.4) and (1.5) follows Neumark’s (1988) notation where X¯ ′a
and X¯ ′d are vectors containing the means of the variables which are presumed to impact
productivity (and subsequently wages) and β̂a and β̂d are the estimated coefficients.
The estimates can then be combined in the following way:
lnpia − lnpid = X¯ ′aβ̂a − X¯ ′dβ̂d. (1.6)
Empirical work using (1.6) has been done using two decompositions. If ∆X¯ ′ = X¯ ′a−X¯ ′d
and ∆β̂ = β̂a − β̂d, then (1.6) becomes either,
lnpia − lnpid = ∆X¯ ′β̂a + X¯ ′d∆β̂ (1.7)
1Equation (1.2) also follows from the usual cost minimization problem and pia
pid
to the ratio of the
marginal productivities.
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or
lnpia − lnpid = ∆X¯ ′β̂d + X¯ ′a∆β̂ (1.8)
The Oaxaca model decomposes wage differentials into a part due to differences in
average productivities (first terms in the right hand side of (1.7) and (1.8)) and a part
due to different wage structures (second terms in the right hand side of (1.7) and (1.8)).
Formulas (1.7) and (1.8) differ in the group taken as reference, which is a in formula
(1.7) and d in (1.8). The β coefficients have this interpretation since they reflect the
returns that individuals will get from their personal characteristics with respect to
wages.
Recently, panel data methods have been used to control for individual wage effects.
In fact the individual effect, which is taken to be constant over time and specific to the
individual, will capture all disturbances that are specific for the individual. Consider,
for instance, a simple wage model in which the log-wage is explained in terms of forma-
tion, experience and managerial ability. This last variable is typically non-observable.
In a panel data context we are able to control for this latent variable by introducing
into the equation an individual effect (assumed to be constant through time), which
can be fixed or random.
Polachek and Kim (1994) use fixed effects to estimate the gender earnings gap with
intercept and slope specific effects. Since gender is a time invariant variable in the panel
data models, a two-stage procedure is employed to estimate the gender gap. Rosholm
and Smith (1996) estimate separate wage equations for male and female workers in
Denmark using panel data techniques in order to identify the sources of changes in the
wage gap. Other refinements to measuring labour market discrimination incorporate
the gender and ethnic compositions as determinants of wages in the different occupa-
tions: Hirsch and Macpherson (1994), Hirsch and Schumacher (1992), and Macpherson
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and Hirsch (1995). Panel data techniques are used to control for occupational charac-
teristics and unobserved worker characteristics encompassing skill and tastes.
1.3 The purpose of my thesis
Many studies have been carried out in order to determine the wage differential between
men and women in Switzerland. For instance: Kugler (1988) uses the traditional
approach, i.e., estimation of selectivity-corrected wage functions and then apply an
Oaxaca decomposition; Bru¨derl et al. (1993), use data for their standard analysis of
the wage gap; Bonjour (1997), applies several different methodological approaches in
her estimation of the wage functions and decomposition of the wage gap; Flu¨ckiger and
Ramirez (2000), show with annual aggregate data the decline of the wage gap.
In Chapters 2 and 3, I will investigate this wage gap from a different point of view,
namely the occupational segregation. More precisely, in Chapter 2, I will examine the
horizontal occupational segregation, which occurs when women are gathered in “female”
occupations. I will extend the analysis based on a cross-sectional Survey by the Swiss
Federal Statistical Office in year 2000, by introducing a new variable, FEM , which
represents the percentage of the female labour force employed in an occupation. This
new variable is included in order to explain the impact of the density of females in a
certain occupation on individual wages (see England 1986, Sorensen 1990). The results
of the studies carried out by England and Sorensen suggest that there is a significant
and negative relationship between the proportion of females in an occupation and their
wages. I then aggregate the FEM -variable into three categories depending on the
portion of women in the occupation. The resulting selection model is estimated by
Heckman two-stage approach.
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Therefore, in Chapter 2 I will apply the same methodology used by Sorensen and
developed by Hansen and Wahlberg (2000), using Swiss data. The goal is find a rela-
tionship between segregation and the gender wage gap.
In Chapter 3 the occupational segregation is treated in a vertical way, namely how
the different phases of the careers affect wage of employees and how males and females
differ in the career opportunities. I will estimate a usual wage equation by introducing
a new latent variable d which is defined equal to 1 if the employee is in the high level
of the job hierarchy and 0 otherwise.
Therefore, in Chapter 3 I will apply a new model to estimated the chance of career
and the wage gap between males and females, using Swiss panel data.
1.4 The data
The data for the empirical analysis in Chapter 2 are drawn from a cross section of
the Enquete Suisse sur la structure des salaires (ESS) in 2000, complemented with
information on occupational segregation taken from the census in 2000. Both these
data sources are supplied by Switzerland Statistics.
The survey (ESS) provides information on labour force market activities and in-
comes for a random sample of firms. It contains 10’500 firms which employ 510’000
workers. The firms are from the private and public sectors and are chosen randomly
from the different regions of Switzerland. The questionnaires are sent to the firms,
which are asked to answer some questions about the characteristics of the employees,
work conditions, such as work place, education, field of activity, type of salaries and
wages. In the case of small firms (1-50 employees), questions are placed to all employ-
ees, for medium firms (50-500) to 50% of the employees and for bigger firms (more than
500) to 10% of the employees. To construct the FEM -variable, which measures the
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proportion of workers who are women in a given occupation, I used information from
the census.
The data for the empirical analysis in Chapter 3 are drawn from a rotating panel
data, the Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS). A subset of individuals is replaced every
year, and an individual can stay in the survey for a maximum of five years. These data
sources are supplied by Switzerland Statistics. The purpose of this survey is to obtain
data about the working environment and professional life in general. It also provides
insight into the living conditions of the employment people, retired people, housewives
as well as students. The SLFS is based on a representative sample of Swiss households.
The interviews are conducted by phone call in the 2nd quarter of each year (from April
to June). To perform my analysis I selected individuals that are in the sample for a
period of five years (from 1999 to 2003), therefore the data used are balanced panel
data.
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Chapter 2
Occupational gender segregation
2.1 Introduction
The term occupational segregation indicates a greater concentration of women or men
in given levels of activity and occupation. Because of occupational segregation in the
labour market, women are often confined in a more narrow range of occupations and
in lower levels of activity compared to men (Robinson, 1998). We can distinguish two
types of segregation: horizontal segregation, which occurs when there is a concentration
of women and men in a determined fields and occupations, and produces disparity
in terms of career, pension, benefits accessories, etc.; and vertical segregation, which
occurs when there is a concentration of women and men in determined degrees and
levels of responsibility or positions, and produces disparity on salaries. In this chapter
I will focus my attention on the case of horizontal segregation.
The purpose of this Chapter is to quantify the degree of occupational segregation in
Switzerland, and if it exists, to find the relationship between wages and the proportion
of women in each occupation. The Chapter is organised as follows. First, I will give
an overview of the literature and some definitions of market segregation. Secondly, I
14
will measure the level of occupational segregation in Switzerland using two different
indices. Thirdly, I estimate the effect of occupational segregation on male and female
wages. Finally, using an ordered probit model I will eliminate the endogenity problem
due to the correlation between the density of females in an occupation and the error
term in the wage equation.
2.2 Theories of occupational segregation by gender
Most of the studies that try to estimate the unexplained portion of the gender wage gap
are based on a sample of male and female workers and try to explain their wages by their
observable characteristics, such as accumulated human capital (formation and years of
work experience) and other factors expected to influence wages (such as marital status
and labour supply). The remaining portion of the wage gap is then often attributed to
employer discrimination.
One candidate for explaining part of the unobserved difference in wages across
gender is occupational segregation, as argue Hansen and Wahlberg (2000). Researchers
usually distinguish between labour supply and labour demand factors when explaining
occupational segregation by gender. Factors related to labour supply generally focus
on why women “prefer” certain types of occupation (for example, women may prefer
works with flexible hours in order to have time for child care). Explanations related
to labour demand focus on why employers generally “prefer” to hire women or men
for particular occupations and why women and men have different opportunities for
promotion and career development within firms in particular sectors.
Theories explaining the existence of occupational segregation by gender can be clas-
sified into three broad categories: neoclassical and human capital theories, institutional
and labour market segmentation theories, and non-economic and feminist (or gender)
theories.
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2.2.1 The neoclassical human capital model
Neoclassical economics assumes that workers and employers are rational and that labour
markets function efficiently (Anker, 1997). According to this theory, workers look for
the best-paying jobs after taking into consideration their own personal endowments
(as education and experience), constraints (e.g. young child to take care of), and
preferences (as a pleasant work environment). Instead the goal of employers is to max-
imize profits by maximizing productivity and minimizing costs to the extent possible.
And given the competition and efficient labour markets, employers pay workers their
marginal product.
The neoclassical economic view explains occupational, or pay, differentials between
individuals or groups by different human capital investment, or by different choices in
the trade off between pecuniary and non pecuniary job rewards.
Zellner (1975) and Polachek (1979, 1982, 1985) pioneered the application of neo-
classical theory in explaining occupational segregation. They suggest that women, who
plan intermittent employment, will maximize lifetime earnings if they choose occupa-
tions with low rates of appreciation and depreciation of human capital. Appreciation
of human capital refers to formal or informal on-the-job training that makes a worker
more productive and leads to wage growth. Human capital theory asserts that those
who plan more years of employment will choose jobs with the highest returns to expe-
rience. Because, on average, men anticipate more job experience than women, women
will select occupations with higher starting wages but smaller returns to experience.
This would lead to occupations with these characteristics to become disproportionately
female. Briefly, these economists assert that average differences in pay between male
and female jobs are all “compensated” for by other advantages of female jobs, such
as fewer skill demands, more pleasant job requirement or working conditions, higher
starting wages, or lower risk of depreciation.
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But no empirical analysis has found the higher starting wages in female occupations
that the theory predicts; to the contrary, starting wages are generally lower in female
than male occupations requiring the same education (Greenberger and Steinberg 1983;
England 1986).
2.2.2 Institutional and labour market segmentation theories
The starting point of the institutional and labour market segmentation theories is the
assumption that institutions, such as unions and large enterprises, play an important
role in determining who is hired, fired and promoted, and how much employees are
paid. Institutional theories are also based on the assumption that labour markets are
segmented in certain ways. And while each labour markets segment may function
according to neo-classical theory, it is difficult for workers to pass from one segment to
another, resulting in non-competitive phenomena in the aggregate.
The most well-known institutional theory is the dual labour market theory, which
distinguishes between a “primary” and a “secondary” sector. Jobs in the primary sector
are relatively good in terms of pay, security, opportunities for advancement and working
conditions (Anker 1997). Secondary sector jobs tend to be relatively poor with respect
to pay, chances for promotion and working conditions, and they tend to provide little
protection or job security. The distinction between primary and secondary sectors has
become less marked in recent years in both industrialized and developing countries.
It is a relatively short step to adapt the concept of dual labour markets to oc-
cupational segregation by gender, with one labour market segment consisting in “fe-
male” occupations and the other in “male” occupations. This segmentation implies
relatively low wage rates in “female” occupations because many women workers are
“overcrowded” into a small number of “female” occupations. “Male” occupations, on
the other hand, benefit from reduced competition within a wider set of occupations
and, consequently, tend to enjoy relatively high wage rates. If females, but not males,
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are crowded into low earnings jobs only due to discrimination, then the gender compo-
sition of a job becomes an index of labour quality for males and, to a small degree, for
females (Hansen and Wahlberg 2000). Males who are relatively less productive accept
low earnings work in primarily female occupations. Over time, low earnings occupa-
tions, crowded by females, would attract relatively less productive males and loose high
productive females. Thus, over time we should observe workers with lower productivity
and lower wages in these occupations.
Labour market segmentation theories are very useful to explaining gender inequal-
ity in the labour market, since they stress the existence of segregated labour market
occupations. However, they do not explain why occupations are in fact segmented by
gender.
2.2.3 Gender theories
The basic idea in the gender theories is that women’s disadvantaged position in the
labour market is caused by, and is a reflection of, patriarchy as well as women’s subor-
dinate position in the society and in the family.
In many societies, household work and child care are seen as women’s primal re-
sponsibility, while being the breadwinner is perceived as men’s main responsibility. As
Anker (1997) explains, this division of responsibilities and the patriarchal ordering of
society are instrumental in determining why women usually accumulate less human
capital compared with men before entering the labour market. That is, why girls re-
ceive less education than boys, and are less likely to pursue fields of study such as
sciences, but are more talented for literature or languages study. The same influences
are also instrumental in explaining why women acquire less labour market experience,
on average, because many of them withdraw from the labour force earlier, and many
others have discontinuous labour experiences.
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Gender theories explain occupational segregation by gender by showing how closely
the characteristics of “female” occupations mirror the common stereotypes of women
and their supposed abilities. One can typically consider three groups of stereotypes
(positive, negative and other). The five “positive” stereotypes typically mentioned in
the literature are: a caring nature, skill and experience in household-related work,
greater manual dexterity, greater honesty, and attractive physical appearance. The five
“negative” stereotypes are: disinclination to supervise others, less physical strength,
less ability in science and mathematics, less willingness to travel, and less willingness
to face physical danger. Three other “neutral” stereotypes are presented: greater
willingness to take orders, greater willingness to accept lower wages and less need for
income, and greater interest in working at home. These stereotypes, if true, would
have a great influence on the general characteristics typifying “female” occupations.
Masculine stereotypes also play a role in determining the occupations which become
typically “male” (such as engineer, truck driver, police officer and construction worker).
In order to break down the gender segregation of occupations, it is important to change
both male and female stereotypes and to integrate men into “female” occupations as
well as women into “male” occupations.
2.3 Measure of the occupational segregation
In the last years, some studies (Silber 1989; Hutchens 1991; Deutsch, Flu¨ckiger and
Silber 1994) have suggested that several approaches applied in the income inequality
literature can be used to measure occupational segregation.
The first index of occupational segregation was proposed by Duncan and Duncan
(1955). In fact, they derived the concept of the Segregation Curve from the traditional
Lorenz Curve which is popular in the income inequality literature. Trends in occupa-
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tional segregation are commonly measured by the index of segregation (Duncan and
Duncan Dissimilarity Index). The index is defined as follows:
S =
1
2
n∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣FiF − MiM
∣∣∣∣ , (2.1)
where Mi is the number of males employed in occupation i, and Fi is the number of
female employed in occupation i, andM and F are the total number of male and female
in the labour force. The index may take on a value between 0 and 1, where zero repre-
sents perfect integration and 1 represents complete segregation. This number gives us
the proportion of women (or men) that would have to be redistributed among occupa-
tions in order for the occupational distribution to reach complete equality between the
sexes1.
Later on Williams (1979) introduced the Size-Standardized Dissimilarity Index (Sd),
which is the absolute measure of the segregation that controls for the effects of the occu-
pational structure, using all occupations as if they were of the same size, computed over
a fixed number of comparable occupational categories. The standardized dissimilarity
index is expressed as
Sd =
1
2
n∑
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∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣

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Ti
)
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i=1
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Ti
)
−

(
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Ti
)
n∑
i=1
(
Mi
Ti
)

∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (2.2)
where Ti is the total number of men and women in occupation i, (Fi/Ti) and (Mi/Ti)
denote the female and male proportions in occupation i, and the dominators adjust
such values to the proportions in the other occupations.
1Unfortunately these indices of occupational segregation are sensitive to the degree of aggregation.
For example, at an highly disaggregated level, a large number of jobs are occupied only virtually by
males or only by females (see Groshen 1991).
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Index Sd is not affected by the shape of the occupational distribution. More pre-
cisely, suppose the total number of workers in a sector doubles but the proportions of
women and men in the sector stay the same. Index Sd does not change, whereas index
S may change. Thus, changes in the absolutes size of the occupations in time do not
affect the value of index Sd.
2.4 Models for empirical analysis
The purpose of this Chapter is to study whether any wage penalty exist for working
in occupations which are characterized by a high concentration of female workers in
Switzerland. In the following sections, after a briefly review of the literature, we intro-
duce the model used for the empirical analysis. We start the analysis with a wage re-
gression with controlling for occupational segregation (section 2.4.1) and in the sesond
part we estimate a regression with Heckman correction for occupational segregation
(section 2.4.2).
The interest among economists in occupational gender segregation stems from the
fairly well established relationship between the gender differential in earnings and
women’s concentration in a small number of occupations. There is a general consensus
that occupational segregation exists and that females are gathered disproportionally in
occupations with lower earnings. There is no agreement on the causes of these out-
comes and two alternative explanations have been given in the literature. The first one
argues that females are gathered disproportional in occupations with low earnings due
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to market discrimination (The Crowding Hypothesis2), and the second one argues that
it is due to a self-sorting mechanism.
Recently, there have been a large number of studies3 devoted to empirically deter-
mine the impact that the density of females in a certain occupation has on individ-
ual wages. See for instance Bayard et al (1999), Macpherson and Hirsch (1995) and
Sorensen (1990) for applications on U.S. data, Baker and Fortin (1999) using Canadian
data, Miller (1987) using data from the U.K., and Hansen and Wahlberg (2000) and
Le Grand (1991) using Swedish data. The results from these studies suggest that there
is a significant and negative relationship between the proportion of females in an oc-
cupation and their wages. The finding that individual wages vary systematically with
the gender composition of occupations is well established in cross-sectional empirical
studies. For examples, Killingsworth (1990) provides two stylized facts regarding the
“femaleness” of occupations: (1) both women and men earn less as the proportion of
females in an occupation increases, and (2) the negative relationship between wages
and percentage of female is stronger for men than for women.
2.4.1 Regression controlling for occupational segregation
In this section I am interested in testing the hypothesis that an individual earns less
if she/he is employed in a job held predominantly by women in Switzerland. One
method of testing this hypothesis is to estimate an earnings equation which includes
2According to the crowding model, employers discriminate against women by excluding them from
occupations considered “men’s work”. Since these jobs are reserved for men, relatively few women are
hired into these positions. Given that the demand for women in these jobs is limited, they are crowded
into other occupations, typically referred to as “women’s work”. The supply of women accordingly
increases for “women’s work”, which in turn reduces their wage.
3The models, used to explain the existence of occupational segregation and lower relative earnings
for women, assume that women and men have equal abilities and thus without discrimination, would
deserve equal remunerations.
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an independent variable measuring the proportion of women workers in an occupation,
FEM , in addition to other traditional explanatory factors.
Following the model introduced by Hirsch and Macpherson (1995), and then devel-
oped by Hansen and Wahlberg (2000), I can define the relationship between wages and
gender composition in two equations as:
lnwi = X ′iβf + θfFEMi + εif ∀i ∈ f (2.3)
lnwi = X ′iβm + θmFEMi + εim ∀i ∈ m (2.4)
where f denotes the set of females in the sample and m denotes the set of males in
the sample. Sub index i denotes individuals (i = 1, .., Nf for women and i = 1, ..., Nm
for men). In addition, lnwi is the natural log of the salary for individual i working
in occupation k, Xi includes a constant, information on the experience (defined as:
age − education level − 6)4, occupational seniority, marital status, domiciled and job
characteristics; FEMi is the percentage of the female labour force employed in occupa-
tion k5. The coefficients β and θ for characteristics X and variable FEM are allowed
to be different for males and females. The last term in equation (2.3) and (2.4) concern
the error structure6 of the model. Unobserved individual-specific disturbance term is
assumed to be captured in εi, effects of unobservable variables that vary across indi-
viduals. It is further assumed that the sequence {εi} consists of normal i.i.d. random
variables with mean zero and a constant variance σ2ε .
4We subtract 6 because in Switzerland children start the school when they are six years old.
5In Table 2.5 are reported the proportions of women in each occupation specification. Note that
the number of occupations k is 24.
6Hansen and Wahlberg (2000) used a different error structure. They consider in addition to the
individual specific effect i an unobserved occupational specific effects vk. They assume that a part
of the error term vk is correlated across workers within occupations. In our model we neglect this
occupation-specific effect as did Bayard et all (1990), Sorensen (1990) and le Grand (1991).
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The interpretation of θf and θm depends on the causes of the occupational segre-
gation and on the ways FEM and wage rates are related. Some explanations of the
occupational segregation are: human capitals differentials, employer discrimination,
restrictions to labour mobility and premarket differences for family and educational
background and the socialization process.
Hirsch and Macpherson (1995) in their analysis find out a negative coefficient for
θ of magnitude -0.090 and -0.139 for males and females respectively. The crowding
model is useful to explain why θf < 0. Women can be concentrated in particular
occupations, due to their preferences or to past and current barriers to alternative
occupations. This crowding compress the wages to a level below the one of similarly
qualified workers in other occupations and the interoccupational mobility is insufficient
to equalize wages. For men, if θm < 0, predominantly female occupations attract less
skilled men. In other words, if women face barriers to better remunerated occupations,
low-wage occupations would attract a disproportionally large number of women and a
small proportion of men, so that there would be a negative correlation between FEM
and male and female wages.
Summarising, a value of θf < 0 and θm < 0 implies that wages decrease with respect
to the proportion of females. Over time, low-paying occupations crowded by women
would attract relatively lower-quality males and lose many high-quality females; thus,
we observe workers in predominantly female jobs with lower average productivities and
wages. FEM serves as a quality index since the probability of a woman being hired into
predominantly male job is an increasing function of productivity. In short, workers are
sorted into occupations based in part on expected productivity, and this productivity
may be correlated with the gender composition (Macpherson and Hirsch, 1995).
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We can see that a potential problem with most of the previous studies7 in this
area is that they assume that occupational attainment can be treated as exogenous,
i.e. there is no correlation between the density of females in an occupation and the
error term in the wage equation. As argued by Macpherson and Hirsch (1995), there
exist at least two reasons for why the exogeneity assumption may be not valid. First,
if men and women with higher unmeasured skills (captured by the error term in the
wage equation) are more likely to be sorted into male jobs and those with lower skills
into female jobs, then the exogeneity assumption will obviously be violated. Second,
the error term may also capture unobserved taste differences among workers. For
example, female workers may foresee future work interruptions due to childbearing and
thus prefer part-time jobs or jobs where the wage “penalty” for absence from work
is low. Therefore, we would observe a concentration of female workers in these types
of jobs, which may also pay lower wages. It is again clear that the assumption of no
correlation between the density of females in an occupation and the error term can be
violated. In other words a problem with the specification (2.4) and (2.5) is that the
variable FEM is endogenous. Indeed, the job characteristics regarding the percentage
of female labour force employed are chosen (to some extent) by the individual, and
the factors determining this choice may be correlated with the error forms in equations
(2.4) and (2.5). To avoid the potential problem with endogeneity, Macpherson and
Hirsch (1995) use longitudinal data covering the period from 1983 to 1993 and appling
a fixed-effect estimator. In my dissertation, to overcome this difficulty, I introduce a
selection model and I estimate it with a version of Heckman two step approach as in
Hansen and Wahlberg (2000). In the next section the model is exposed.
7In Bayard et al (1999), Sorensen (1990) and le Grand (1991)
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2.4.2 Regression with Heckman correction for occupational segrega-
tion
I transform the variable FEM in a discrete variable, representing different types of
occupation, e.g. male dominated, female dominated or an intermediate occupation.
An ordered Probit model is specified for the selection of the type of occupation by the
individuals. The selection equation can be specified as follows:
FEMi = k if µk−1 < FEM∗i < µk, for k = 0, 1, 2 (2.5)
FEM∗i = γjZi + ηi, j = f,m (2.6)
where FEM∗i is a continuous latent variable, coefficients µ are unknown parameters to
be estimated, and reflect threshold values for moving through the occupational choice
decision. In my analysis, the vector Z contains the explanatory variables in X and
some additional variables, which will be described in the next section.
Then, separate wage regressions are specified for males and females and for each
value of the FEM variable.
lnwi = X ′iβfk + εif if FEMi = k and ∀i ∈ f (2.7)
lnwi = X ′iβmk + εim if FEMi = k and ∀i ∈ m (2.8)
The errors εi and ηi are assumed jointly normal, εi
ηi
 ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 σ2ε σεη
σ2η
 . (2.9)
The covariance term σεη accounts for correlation between variable FEM and individual
error εi in the regression.
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The model (2.5)-(2.8) is estimated by a Heckeman-type two-stage procedure. More
precisely, it is possible to show that (ref. Maddala (1999))
E(εi | FEMi = k) = σεη
σ2η
φ(µk−1 − γjZi)− φ(µk − γjZi)
Φ(µk − γjZi)− Φ(µk−1 − γjZi) =
σεη
σ2η
λijk, (2.10)
where φ and Φ are the p.d.f and the c.d.f. of standard Gaussian. A consistent estimation
γ̂ of γ and µ̂k of µk, k = 0, 1, 2, are obtained by apply Maximum Likelihood on the
Probit model (2.5), (2.6). Then, I construct an estimator of the selection term.
λ̂ijk =
φ(µ̂k−1 − γ̂jZi)− φ(µ̂k − γ̂jZi)
Φ(µ̂k − γ̂jZi)− Φ(µ̂k−1 − γ̂jZi) . (2.11)
In the second step I estimate the following equation by OLS
lnwi = X ′iβjk + δjkλ̂ijk + errors j = f,m and k = 1, 2, 3 (2.12)
where the coefficients8 of variables Xi is βjk if individual i is of gender j in occupation
k.
2.5 The results
In the next subsection I show the results obtained from a general analysis of the gender
composition in the workplace. Results from the linear regression with control for occu-
pational segregation and concluding with the model decomposed in three occupational
categories.
8The standard errors of the estimated coefficients are biased because we do not consider that λ is
estimated.
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2.5.1 The gender stratification in Switzerland
There is a general perception that in Switzerland many women are becoming increas-
ingly oriented toward non-traditional family roles and non-traditional jobs in the work-
place. However, if I take a look at the statistics, I note that in Switzerland the choice
between working or studying is still related to gender.
To better understand the nature of the gender segregation in Switzerland, it is useful
to consider a few things about the Swiss educational system. The Swiss educational
system is highly differentiated and vocationally-oriented. After completing eight or nine
years of compulsory school, young people can either join the labour force as unskilled
workers, go to the secondary school (university-track), or enrol in vocational training
(either in a full-time vocational school or in a part-time vocational school combined
with an apprenticeship). The choice between these options is largely determined by the
earlier educational career of the individual. Moreover, access to nearly all medium and
high status occupations in Switzerland is strictly limited to those who have completed
the corresponding vocational education.
In Table 2.1 we can observe the highest educational level vested from women and
men in Switzerland for the years 1970 until 2000. It can be noted that the percentage
of women who decide to stop the school career after the compulsory school is clearly
bigger than for men, for all periods. However, this percentage is decreasing over time,
for both men and women, and the gender gap is becoming smaller.
Through the analysis of 6 classes of age (Table 2.2), one can see the generational
differences in the educational choices of employed people. It can be noted that the
percentage of women between 25 and 34 years old, that have achieved a university
degree, is bigger than for older women. It seems that the young generation, of women,
is more motivated to continue its studies compared to the older generation. In the
period from 1980-2000, the participation of women in universities (Table 2.3) increases
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(to 46.5%), and women tend not be segregated in “female” faculties but they choose also
“male” faculties (as medicine, pharmacies and technical sciences), even if the percentage
of women remains lower than that of men. Concerning the vocational school (Table
2.4), women are more oriented towars professions in the sanitary sector, textile and
clothes industry, as well as commerce, organisation and administration. Instead men
have a fan of choices more rich.
In general, differences between men and women in overall educational attainment
remain substantial in Switzerland. Women complete fewer years of formal education,
are less likely to pursue vocational education and tend to graduate from universities
at a lower rate with respect to men. When women do complete vocational training, it
is generally of shorter duration than men. This fact is consistent with the arguments
put forward by neoclassical economists. They argue that women may prefer not to
make large educational investments. This may partially account for the large gender
differences in the educational environment (see Table 2.1 and 2.2).
Another characteristic of the Swiss society, that may be relevant while studying
occupational gender segregation, is the extreme structural incompatibility of work and
family roles. Although nearly all Swiss women are professionally active prior the mar-
riage, labour force participation of wives is dramatically lower (Charles, 1994). The
majority of women either give up or greatly curtail their labour force activity with the
birth of the first child.
A number of contextual factors limit Swiss mothers’ labour attachment. First,
public and private childcare arrangements are extremely scarce in Switzerland. Sec-
ond, school schedules are highly incompatible with the demands of two-earner families:
children return home daily for a two-hour lunch break, and school hours vary widely
from day to day and from child to child. Third, the ideology of “motherhood” and the
sexual division of labour within the family are firmly entrenched in the Swiss culture.
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And fourth, male wages are traditionally quite high in Switzerland; this makes it gener-
ally possible to comfortably raise a family on a single income. However, during the last
few years life in Switzerland has become more expensive and most families now need
two salaries. This determines an increase in the demand of public or private childcare
arrangements (Banfi, 2006) and grandparents are forced to help growing up children.
2.5.2 Indices of occupational segregation
Table 2.5 reports some measures of occupational segregation in Switzerland for the
years 1980-2000. Note that the number of occupations is different in the years 1970-
1980 and in the years 1990-2000. The Dissimilarity Index decreases during the years
from 0.63 to 0.44. This means that to reach perfect integration, 44% of women must be
redistributed among occupations in 2000. The Size-Standardized Dissimilarity Index
features the same trend, from 0.63 to 0.56. In both cases we can see that gender
segregation in Switzerland is declining over time.
In Figure 2.1 are reported the segregation curves for the years 1970-2000 in Switzer-
land. We can see that all of the segregation curves moved to the left over time, hence
the observed segregation has decreased.
A comparison of standardized segregation-index scores in 25 industrial countries
shows that Switzerland is second only to Luxembourg in the overall level of occupa-
tional gender segregation (Charles, 1992). As Charles (1994) argues, this distinction is
due in large part to Swiss women’s overrepresentation in sales occupations and their
underrepresentation in management.
A general examination of Swiss women’s and men’s occupational distributions re-
veals that gender segregation tends to occur very early in the individual life and persists
for a long time in the professional career.
A research by Charles and Buchmann (1994) helps to identify some macro-level
factors that also contribute to explain Switzerland’s extraordinarily high level of gender
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segregation. These factors include a relatively conservative ideological climate, a low
rate of female labour force participation and the relatively large proportion of the Swiss
labour force with employee (as opposed to self-employed) status.
2.5.3 Wage regressions controlling for occupational segregation
In this section I present the results on estimation of the wage regressions, equations
(2.4)-(2.5). The explanatory variables are reported in Table 2.1. They include marital
status, dummies for the level of education, dummies related to the foreigner status,
experience, occupational seniority, and dummies for job characteristics, namely the
variable position. This variable gives an indication on the job hierarchy level of the
employee, and it is subdivided in 5 levels. From position 1 to position 5, where position
1 is the low level and position 5 is the high level (top management category).
Estimation is performed separately for males and females, without introducing the
FEM variable (Table 2.8), and by including the FEM variable (Table 2.9). The first
and second columns of the Table 2.8 represent the estimates for males, the third and
fourth columns for females. The variable married is significant for both males and
females, but while for women the impact is negative, for men it is positive. For women,
being married reduces the monthly earnings by 3%, whereas earnings are increased for
men by 5%. The dummy variables corresponding to the different levels of formation
are all significant. As expected, the estimated coefficients are positive and increasing as
the level of educations increases, for both males and females. In particular for women
having a high formation increases the monthly salary of 56%, instead for men this effect
is about 50%. Let us consider the variables experience and occupational seniority.
For men and women, they are both significant, with a quadratic specification implying
a positive effect, and the experience has an higher impact (0.025 and 0.022 for males
and females respectively) than the occupational seniority (0.008 and 0.009 for male
and females respectively). As expected the position variable is significant and positive
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and increasing as the level of position increases, for both males and females. But while
the dummy position 5 has a big impact on the wage for males, in the case of females
this impact is relatively smaller.
Let us now consider the results in Table 2.9. First overall note that the introducing
of the variable FEM do not improve the estimation of the wage equation. In fact the
estimate of the coefficients are similar to those reported in Table 2.8. The effect of
the variable FEM is negative and significant for both female and male wages, with
a value of −0.0531 for women, and −0.0658 for men. The meaning of the negative
values of θw and θm imply lower female and male wages in jobs with higher densities of
female workers. Note that the coefficient for women is smaller than the coefficient for
men. Macpherson and Hirsh (1995) found a larger negative effect of FEM on wages
for females than males.
2.5.4 Two step Heckman estimation
In Table 2.10 and 2.11 are reported some descriptive statistics for males and females
and by occupational type (male dominated, intermediate and female dominated oc-
cupation). In Table 2.12 are report the results for the ordered probit model. The
first two columns refer to males, while the last two columns display results for females.
Note that in these regressions new explanatory variables are added, such as the dummy
part − time, dummies for skill, dummies for the firm size and the variable age. The
variable skill is a 4 levels variable, which indicate the characteristics of the job, from
the lowest skill namely a job with repetitive tasks (skill1) until job that involve high
qualify tasks (skill4). For the size of the firm we consider 4 categories, from the smallest
with 1-10 employees (Firm Small) to the extra-large with more than 500 employees
(Firm Extra− large).
For both males and females, the results show that the education and occupational
choice are strongly correlated and that the probability of working in a male dominated
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occupation is higher for individuals with higher education. For females, the estimated
coefficients are decreasing with respect to the education level. For males, the estimated
coefficient is smaller for formation4 than for formation2, as expected, the coefficient
for formation3 is not significant. Women without education are more likely to work
in female dominated occupations. Work experience has the same effect as education,
the higher the experience, the higher the probability of working in a male dominated
occupation. These results are in accordance with economic theory (see Section 2.2).
Also the variable married has a significant impact on both male of female occupational
choice. The impact is negative, which means that married individuals are more likely
to work in a male occupation. As far as women are concerned, this result is rather
difficult to reconcile with economic theory, which argues that married women are more
likely to work in female occupation where the wage penalty for absence from work is
low. The negative coefficient for the variable foreign implies that foreigners are more
likely to work in a male dominated occupation.
Looking the effects of the additional variables on occupational choice, I see that age
has a positive estimate coefficient for males, but not for females. This means that men
from older cohorts are more likely to have jobs in segregated occupations. Therefore, the
assumption that occupational segregation is more pronounced among older cohorts than
among younger ones is confirmed only for the male case. For the part− time dummy,
the estimate for females is positive, which implies that, females who are working part-
time are more likely to hold a job in a female dominated occupation. For males, the
same reasoning applies. These results are not surprising. Indeed, assuming that the
age-earnings profile for women is flatter in female dominated occupations, the wage
penalty of work absence is lower in these jobs. I would then expect women with many
children (and therefore with more work absence) to prefer working part-time rather
than in jobs where working full-time is mandatory (as in most male dominated jobs).
For both males and females, the results show that the probability of working in a male
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dominated occupation is higher for the individuals with higher skill. For the dummies
firm size only the variable Firm Extra− large has a positive effect, and only for males.
This means that the probability for males of working in a female dominated occupation
is higher for men employed in an extra-large firm.
Table 2.13 contains the estimates for the wage equation (2.12) including the Heck-
man’s correction term. The results in the first two columns refer to male dominated
occupations, columns three and four show the results for integrated occupations and
the last two columns display estimates for females working in female dominated oc-
cupations. The results in the three occupations can be compared with the estimates
reported in Table 2.8. For all regressors, the estimated coefficients in Table 2.13 are
rather similar in the male dominated, female dominated and intermediary sector, and
similar to the estimates in Table 2.8 (see section 2.5.3 for a discussion of the estimates).
However, the constant differs across sectors and appears to be larger in the male
dominate sector. Thus, in accordance with economic theory (see Section 2.2), females
employed in the male dominated sector have an higher wage than in the other two
sectors9. Finally, the selection correction variable, λ, is significant supporting the
hypothesis that women self-select themselves into different occupations. Hence, I can
reject the hypothesis that women are randomly allocated into different occupations.
Table 2.14 contains the wage estimates for males. Most of the results are in accor-
dance with prior expectations. The results regarding the effect of human capital imply
higher return to education in all the different occupations and also an higher return
in work experience. Further, there is a significant and positive wage effect on being
9We note that the estimated constant for the female dominated sector is larger than for the inter-
mediary sector. This fact is rather unintuitive. However the difference is not statistically significant,
and is likely due to sample variability.
34
married. Also in this case, the selection correction variable is significant, suggesting
that men self-select themselves into different occupations.
Table 2.15 contains the estimates of the observed wage differentials in the OLS
model and in three occupational groups. The observed gender wage gap is of 13.3%in
the model without control for occupational segregation. In the model with the variable
FEM the gap is, as expected, slightly smaller. Concerning the three occupational
groups, I note that the intermediate group has the biggest wage differential (24.4%).
The wage gap is smallest (2.1%) in male dominated occupations. This suggests that
for women it would be better to work in male dominated occupations instead of in the
female dominated occupations, where the wage differential is of 7.7%.
2.6 Conclusions
In the first part of this chapter I have gathered some basic evidence regarding the
individual-level determinants of occupational gender segregation in the Swiss labour
market. A general examination of Swiss women’s and men’s occupational distributions
reveals that gender segregation tends to occur very early in the individual life and
persists in the labour market career. There is some evidence that Swiss mothers are
more likely than their childless counterparts to work in female-dominated occupations.
Two factors, which are formal education and organization of everyday life, might in-
fluence the individual-level processes of human capital development and occupational
allocation.
The purpose of the second part of this chapter was to study the existence of any
wage penalty for working in occupations are characterized by high concentration of
female workers in Switzerland. I found a negative effect on male and female estimated
wages, confirming the hypothesis of a wage penalty. We can conclude that occupations
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dominated by female pay lower wages to women and men. Considering the two-step
Heckman estimation, we can notice that the inclusion of correction terms for self-
selection show to have a significant impact on the results, supporting the hypothesis
that women and men self-select themselves into different occupations. Moreover oc-
cupational segregation appears to influence the gender wage gap. In fact in different
occupational categories we find different wage gap. The lowest wage gap, that we found,
is in the male dominated occupation.
We must remember that in Switzerland legislation which assures equal opportunities
and equal wages between men and women was only effectively passed in 1990s. And
issue such maternity benefit and child-care facility are more often present in political
debate. These measures will most probably, in the next years, induce a decrease in the
index of occupational segregation and also in the wage gap.
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Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Log Earnings The natural log of monthly earnings
FEM 0 if he/she is in male dominated occupation,
1 if he/she is in intermediate occupation and
2 if he/she is in female dominated occupation
Independent Variables
Age The individual age
FEM The percentage of female in an occupation k
Married 1 if he/she is married, 0 otherwise
Formation 1 1 if the highest level of study is compulsory schooling,
0 otherwise
Formation 2 1 if the highest level of study is apprenticeship,
0 otherwise
Formation 3 1 if the highest level of study is high school,
0 otherwise
Formation 4 1 if the highest level of study is university degree,
0 otherwise
Foreign 1 if he/she is foreign, 0 otherwise
Permit C 1 if he/she has a permit C, 0 otherwise
Experience Number of years of prior work experience
Experience squared Work experience squared
Occupational seniority Number of years worked for current employers
Occupational seniority squared Occupational seniority squared
Position 1 1 if he/she is no one management category, 0 otherwise
Position 2 1 if he/she has a supervisor position, 0 otherwise
Position 3 1 if he/she is in the low management category, 0 otherwise
Position 4 1 if he/she is in the middle management category,
0 otherwise
Position 5 1 if he/she is in the top management category,
0 otherwise
Skill 1 1 if the job involves simple or repetitive activities,
0 otherwise
Skill 2 1 if the job involves specialized professional acquaintances,
0 otherwise
Skill 3 1 if the job involves qualify activities, 0 otherwise
Skill 4 1 if the job involves the most qualify activities and
the most difficult tasks, 0 otherwise
Firm Small 1 if in the firm are employed 1-10 individuals, 0 otherwise
Firm Medium 1 if in the firm are employed 11-50 individuals, 0 otherwise
Firm Large 1 if in the firm are employed 51-500 individuals, 0 otherwise
Firm Extra-Large 1 if in the firm are employed 500 and more individuals, 0 otherwise
Table 2.1: Variables Definitions
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1970 1980 1990 2000
Males Females Males Females Males Females Males Females
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Without Formation 0.33 0.37 3.40 3.34 2.55 2.43 2.33 2.60
Compulsory School 34.02 50.99 29.89 39.98 20.55 27.29 19.05 25.55
Vocational School 39.59 20.37 46.94 40.71 52.57 53.16 44.07 44.71
High School and Teaching 5.80 8.58 2.77 6.44 2.56 6.40 5.98 11.76
Superior Vocational School 10.73 10.95 9.12 3.59 13.34 5.62 16.38 7.61
University 4.66 1.25 6.84 2.86 7.81 3.97 12.18 7.77
Other 4.87 7.48 1.04 3.08 0.62 1.13 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2.2: Percentage of the formation degree for employed persons in
Switzerland for the years 1970-2000
In the table are reported the percentage of employed male and female in Switzerland for the years
1970-2000.
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Males in Switzerland in year 2000
Formation Degree 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Without Formation 2.71 1.84 2.25 2.68 2.54 1.49
Compulsory School 45.06 12.95 15.00 16.44 18.12 17.28
Vocational School 39.85 46.72 42.91 44.91 45.30 37.04
High School and Teaching 9.54 7.13 5.58 4.79 3.74 4.59
Superior Vocational School 1.94 18.23 19.72 17.47 17.69 19.31
University 0.90 13.13 14.54 13.72 12.60 20.29
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Females in Switzerland in year 2000
Formation Degree 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Without Formation 2.46 1.71 2.72 3.08 3.41 3.47
Compulsory School 40.48 15.26 21.85 27.26 32.41 38.92
Vocational School 39.40 49.02 45.38 44.27 42.73 35.41
High School and Teaching 14.76 12.93 11.28 10.60 9.01 9.34
Superior Vocational School 1.83 10.23 9.08 7.30 6.61 6.35
University 1.06 10.85 9.70 7.49 5.84 6.50
Other 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Table 2.3: Percentage of the formation degree for 6 classes of age
In the table are reported the percentage of male and female in the different degree of formation for 6
classes of age in Switzerland for the year 2000.
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1980/81 1992/93 2001/02
Univesity Students M% F% M% F% M% F%
Social and Human Sciences 48.0 52.0 41.1 58.9 36.9 63.1
Medicine and Pharmacy 65.8 34.2 52.6 47.4 43.8 56.2
Law 73.1 26.9 58.3 41.7 51.2 48.8
Natural Sciences 78.3 21.7 73.6 26.4 67.3 32.7
Technical Sciences 91.9 8.1 82.7 17.3 77.0 23.0
Economic Sciences 84.6 15.4 76.1 23.9 71.6 28.4
Interdisciplinary, other 68.5 31.5 62.3 37.7 60.2 39.8
Total 67.7 32.3 59.9 40.1 53.5 46.5
Table 2.4: University students in the different faculty
Percentage of the participation of students in the different university faculty for the years 1980, 1992
and 2001.
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Professional Sector 2001/02
M% F%
Textile Industry and clothing 11.1 88.9
Hygiene and Treatment 11.2 88.8
Organisation, Administration and Commerce 37.0 63.0
Artistic Profession 58.3 41.7
Hotel Industry and Domestic Science 67.4 32.6
Agriculture and Breeding 86.3 13.7
Interdisciplinary, other 68.5 31.5
Leather and Scalp-Working 50.0 50.0
Communications and Transports 72.7 27.3
Graphic art 83.1 16.9
Design and Technical profession 81.2 18.8
Jewels and Watchmaker Industry 78.3 21.7
Land, Stone and Glass-Working 100 0
Painting 97.6 2.4
Wood and Cork-Working 99.4 0.6
Building Industry 100 0
Chemistry Industry 100 0
Metallurgist Industry and Machine 98.7 1.3
Cleaning 59.4 40.6
Others Professions 97.1 2.9
Total 69.6 30.4
Table 2.5: Students in the different vocational study
In the table are reported the percentage of women and men in different vocational study in Switzerland
for the year 2001/02.
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Occupation Prop. of women
Construction 0.016
Manufacturing: Precision-tool 0.099
Administration: Government and Business 0.101
Workshop and Construction 0.139
Transport and Communication 0.161
Analysis and Development 0.166
Security service (police) 0.181
Manufacturing 0.187
Research and development 0.220
Sales and Purchase (business services) 0.227
Logistics, General Staff 0.251
Agriculture and Breeding 0.280
Law 0.344
Others Activities 0.363
Sport and culture 0.421
Hotel Industry and Domestic Science 0.533
Accounting, personnel management,
finance management 0.545
Administration: Other 0.574
Education 0.618
Public cleaning 0.627
Retail Sales (goods and services) 0.715
Secretariat and back office 0.782
Medicine, Health and Nursing 0.809
Hygiene and Treatment 0.836
Table 2.6: Occupational Specification and Proportion of Women in each Oc-
cupation
Values used for the construction of the variable FEM.
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Census year 1970 1980 1990 2000
Number of occupations 321 321 378 378
Females 1’019’896 1’107’960 1’402’009 1’654’996
Males 1’969’904 1’959’273 2’178’904 2’134’420
Total 2’989’800 3’067’233 3’580’913 3’789’416
Weighted average, F/M 0.51774 0.56549 0.64344 0.77538
Dissimilarity Index 0.62849 0.61193 0.54662 0.44098
Size-Standardized Dissimilarity Index 0.65629 0.63299 0.57706 0.55801
Table 2.7: Measures of the occupational distribution in Switzerland 1970-
2000
Summary measures of the occupational distribution of the gender ratio in Switzerland 1970-2000.
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant term 8.092676 0.003095 7.993337 0.003202
Married 0.050017 0.001477 -0.037031 0.001607
Formation2 0.135631 0.001971 0.172148 0.001977
Formation3 0.232371 0.002369 0.255005 0.002568
Formation4 0.511448 0.002659 0.563092 0.003631
Foreign -0.127841 0.00173 -0.102204 0.002293
Permit C -0.097293 0.001702 -0.0779 0.002139
Experience 0.024965 0.000257 0.021843 0.000273
Experience squared -0.042047 0.000508 -0.040457 0.000568
Occupational seniority 0.007852 0.000216 0.00934 0.000299
Occupational seniority squared -0.01028 0.000619 -0.009436 0.001026
Position 2 0.083919 0.002109 0.131335 0.00257
Position 3 0.21796 0.002037 0.216754 0.002852
Position 4 0.359339 0.002394 0.320205 0.004135
Position 5 0.509075 0.002717 0.363924 0.006251
Observations 220158 143435
R-squared 0.524801 0.366437
F-statistic 17299.72 5922.334
All values are significant at 1 percent level
Table 2.8: Regression analysis of the salaries of active employees in 2000
In this table I have made two separeted regressions on the gender, without control for occupational
segregation.
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Figure 2.1: Segregation curves: 1970-2000
The figure reports the segregation curves, in Switzerland, for the years: 1970-2000. The curves are
obtained by using the cumulative of the ratio Fi/F and Mi/M .
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant term 8.117092 0.003286 8.021562 0.003762
FEM -0.065828 0.002939 -0.05307 0.003682
Married 0.048836 0.001483 -0.036342 0.001612
Formation2 0.134677 0.001974 0.176709 0.002003
Formation3 0.233442 0.002374 0.258086 0.002583
Formation4 0.512722 0.002673 0.565456 0.003695
Foreign -0.130661 0.001737 -0.10538 0.002304
Permit C -0.098775 0.001706 -0.079398 0.002144
Experience 0.024741 0.000258 0.021755 0.000274
Experience squared -0.041637 0.000509 -0.040168 0.000569
Occupational seniority 0.007669 0.000216 0.009065 0.0003
Occupational seniority squared -0.010027 0.000621 -0.00889 0.001029
Position 2 0.086725 0.002118 0.131665 0.002581
Position 3 0.221519 0.002047 0.215104 0.002862
Position 4 0.363247 0.002412 0.317365 0.004153
Position 5 0.50654 0.002724 0.354881 0.006293
Observations 218720 142724
R-squared 0.525746 0.365
F-statistic 16115.85 5463.79
All values are significant at 1 percent level
Table 2.9: Regression analysis of the salaries of active employees in 2000
In this table I have made two separate regressions on the gender, introducing also the new variable
FEM which capture the density of female in the labour force.
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WOMEN
Male Dominated Intermediate Female Dominated
Occupation Occupation Occupation
Characteristics Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Wage monthly 4’902.20 2’443.20 5’441.50 2’309.70 4’414.80 1’526.20
Married 0.55 - 0.47 - 0.53 -
Formation 2 0.40 - 0.58 - 0.60 -
Formation 3 0.13 - 0.18 - 0.12 -
Formation 4 0.07 - 0.10 - 0.03 -
Foreign 0.20 - 0.12 - 0.11 -
Permit C 0.22 - 0.13 - 0.15 -
Experience 22.34 11.40 20.00 11.53 21.42 12.16
Occupational seniority 9.09 7.97 7.61 7.51 7.43 6.99
Position 2 0.06 - 0.11 - 0.08 -
Position 3 0.05 - 0.11 - 0.05 -
Position 4 0.03 - 0.05 - 0.02 -
Position 5 0.03 - 0.02 - 0.00 -
Part time 0.29 - 0.38 - 0.52 -
Skill 2 0.35 - 0.51 - 0.48 -
Skill 3 0.10 - 0.17 - 0.08 -
Skill 4 0.03 - 0.02 - 0.01 -
Firm Medium 0.13 - 0.16 - 0.10 -
Firm Large 0.28 - 0.22 - 0.16 -
Firm Extra-large 0.52 - 0.50 - 0.63 -
Age 39.34 10.91 38.04 11.22 38.62 12.00
Number of observations 37’069 69’912 98’220
Table 2.10: Descriptive statistics by occupational type, for females
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MEN
Male Dominated Intermediate Female Dominated
Occupation Occupation Occupation
Characteristics Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Wage monthly 6’658.70 4’015.40 7’627.90 4’512.10 5’547.10 2’527.10
Married 0.67 - 0.59 - 0.56 -
Formation 2 0.57 - 0.50 - 0.59 -
Formation 3 0.15 - 0.22 - 0.16 -
Formation 4 0.12 - 0.20 - 0.07 -
Foreign 0.19 - 0.14 - 0.14 -
Permit C 0.20 - 0.13 - 0.20 -
Experience 23.41 11.21 20.56 11.17 21.07 11.93
Occupational seniority 11.40 9.91 9.75 9.37 8.96 8.73
Position 2 0.09 - 0.10 - 0.10 -
Position 3 0.09 - 0.16 - 0.10 -
Position 4 0.06 - 0.12 - 0.06 -
Position 5 0.06 - 0.07 - 0.03 -
Part time 0.05 - 0.08 - 0.17 -
Skill 2 0.48 - 0.46 - 0.49 -
Skill 3 0.19 - 0.29 - 0.18 -
Skill 4 0.09 - 0.10 - 0.04 -
Firm Medium 0.15 - 0.13 - 0.10 -
Firm Large 0.29 - 0.22 - 0.18 -
Firm Extra-large 0.45 - 0.54 - 0.63 -
Age 41.40 11.12 39.54 10.89 38.49 12.05
Number of observations 172’418 75’561 35’612
Table 2.11: Descriptive statistics by occupational type, for males
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. err. Est. Std.err.
Married -0.08896 0.006257 -0.03381 0.006745
Formation 2 -0.03312 0.013404 0.329821 0.014813
Formation 3 0.028105 0.017027 0.20387 0.019072
Formation 4 -0.29956 0.027374 -0.0395 0.035314
Foreign -0.13553 0.007779 -0.18335 0.009462
Permit C -0.06741 0.007572 -0.07707 0.008886
Experience -0.04971 0.003832 -0.00913 0.004792
Experience squared 0.024758 0.002165 0.042763 0.00232
Occupational seniority -0.02618 0.000943 -0.01563 0.00122
Occupational seniority squared 0.033901 0.002723 0.007951 0.004142
Position 2 0.227925 0.009068 0.022753 0.010609
Position 3 0.34972 0.008996 -0.05589 0.012102
Position 4 0.430752 0.010921 -0.13524 0.017629
Position 5 0.194338 0.014593 -0.46832 0.028317
Part-time 0.57928 0.01011 0.429596 0.006765
Skill 2 -0.03683 0.008418 0.165741 0.008042
Skill 3 0.068513 0.010598 0.108467 0.012259
Skill 4 -0.11466 0.015143 -0.09712 0.026125
Firm Medium -0.05127 0.009808 -0.20953 0.010973
Firm Large -0.07825 0.009196 -0.32989 0.010352
Firm Extra-large 0.221783 0.008855 -0.15272 0.009673
Age 0.036229 0.003736 -0.00984 0.004708
µ1 0.740181 0.059132 -1.08817 0.073572
µ2 1.701346 0.059193 0.005097 0.073553
N 218104 142509
All values are significant at 1 percent level
Table 2.12: Ordered probit estimates
Estimation of the probit model for male and female, where the dependent variable admits three values:
0 if male dominated occupation, 1 if intermediate and 2 if female dominated.
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Male dominated Intermadiate Female dominated
Variable Est. Std.err. Est. Std.err. Est. Std.err.
Constant term 8.025139 0.00674 7.99943 0.003082 8.01249 0.004785
Married -0.035233 0.00168 -0.035172 0.001679 -0.035272 0.001681
Formation 2 0.178901 0.00219 0.179336 0.002198 0.178505 0.002175
Formation 3 0.259513 0.00284 0.259873 0.002847 0.259167 0.002829
Formation 4 0.565687 0.004151 0.565554 0.00415 0.565838 0.004151
Foreign -0.108573 0.002663 -0.108927 0.002667 -0.108238 0.002657
Permit C -0.080923 0.002223 -0.081129 0.002227 -0.080731 0.002218
Experience 0.021571 0.000269 0.021553 0.000269 0.021588 0.000269
Experience squared -0.039721 0.000584 -0.039673 0.000585 -0.039763 0.000584
Occupational seniority 0.008977 0.000326 0.008958 0.000326 0.008991 0.000326
Occupational seniority squared -0.008891 0.001132 -0.008895 0.001132 -0.008879 0.001132
Position 2 0.132205 0.002471 0.13226 0.002471 0.132153 0.00247
Position 3 0.214771 0.003031 0.214715 0.003031 0.214811 0.003031
Position 4 0.315682 0.005117 0.315387 0.005117 0.315975 0.005115
Position 5 0.352383 0.01001 0.350934 0.010017 0.35388 0.009996
λ 0.022178 0.004238 0.02029 0.003687 -0.028299 0.005618
R-squared 0.362721 0.362708 0.362741
N 142564 142564 142564
All values are significant at 1 percent level
Table 2.13: Wage equation estimates for females by occupation
In this table I have made three separated regressions on the occupation for the female sample. The
dependent variable is the logarithm of wage.
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Male dominated Intermadiate Female dominated
Variable Est. Std.err. Est. Std.err. Est. Std.err.
Constant term 7.931463 0.005474 8.05603 0.003301 8.000197 0.00427
Married 0.061083 0.001523 0.06298 0.001524 0.058618 0.001519
Formation 2 0.134983 0.001624 0.133663 0.001623 0.135998 0.001626
Formation 3 0.213733 0.002357 0.210011 0.002362 0.218263 0.002348
Formation 4 0.519358 0.002798 0.519243 0.002794 0.519051 0.002801
Foreign -0.106422 0.001896 -0.101749 0.001913 -0.112043 0.001874
Permit C -0.083989 0.001764 -0.081186 0.00177 -0.087379 0.001756
Experience 0.027041 0.000266 0.027246 0.000265 0.026687 0.000266
Experience squared -0.046038 0.000535 -0.046413 0.000534 -0.045379 0.000536
Occupational seniority 0.010814 0.000234 0.011377 0.000236 0.010126 0.000232
Occupational seniority squared -0.014197 0.000636 -0.014819 0.000636 -0.01336 0.000636
Position 2 0.060423 0.001958 0.055414 0.001974 0.066483 0.001934
Position 3 0.176074 0.002371 0.16898 0.002389 0.185502 0.002327
Position 4 0.313793 0.003214 0.305959 0.003231 0.324137 0.003175
Position 5 0.50151 0.004385 0.499722 0.004388 0.503341 0.004382
λ -0.200986 0.005992 -0.141263 0.00368 0.297932 0.010769
R-squared 0.52381 0.524391 0.523168
N 218283 218283 218283
All values are significant at 1 percent level
Table 2.14: Wage equation estimates for males by occupation
Estimation for male. The dependent variable is the logarithm of wage.
Male-Female Wage Gaps
OLS OLS Male Intermediate Female
with FEM Dominated Dominated
Observed Gap 0.1332 0.1207 0.0211 0.2424 0.0770
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0066) (0.0032) (0.0045)
Table 2.15: Observed wage gaps
OLS with FEM: estimation with control for occupational segregation.
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Chapter 3
Determinants of vertical
occupational segregation and the
wage gap
3.1 Introduction
Traditionally, the gender wage gap has been explained by gender differences in the
level of human capital and by discriminatory forces in the labour market that reduce
the earning capacity of women. In the previous chapter I have analysed the gender
wage gap from the point of view of horizontal occupational segregation. Now, I am
interested in studying the characteristics of vertical occupational segregation, namely
how the different phases of the careers affect the wage of employees and how male and
female differ in career opportunities.
Income growth is the typical marker for a successful career. However, careers also
include episodes of joblessness, which may inhibit career development. Since careers
unfold over time, analyzing job rewards in cross-sectional samples overlooks an impor-
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tant sorting process that creates and maintains wage disparities among workers. The
purpose of this chapter is to give new insights into the dynamic nature of the career
development by studying the impact of some specific variables on the work mobility
through job hierarchy.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the second section, theoretical bases are ex-
posed. The data are described in the third section. In the fourth section, empirical
models are discussed to identify the main variables that affect wages and level of the
job hierarchy. The methods of estimation are presented in the fifth section, and in
the sixth section is illustrated the computation of the gender wage gap. Estimation
results are reported in the seventh section. In the last section, the main results are
summarized.
3.2 Theoretical bases
Much of the research on occupational segregation (Acker 1990, Baron and Newman
1990, Reskin 1988) has examined its effect on reward. However the findings from
these studies imply also that segregation affects promotion chances. That is, unequal
career opportunities exist for men and women, with women often confined to dead-end
jobs. Despite the increasing presence of women in corporations, they fail to attain top
managerial positions in the firm. Numerous studies indicate that women and men with
similar abilities are allocated to different positions when entering in a firm (Bielby and
Baron, 1986; Kanter, 1977; Reskin, 1988; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993).
Three explanations for the phenomenon of vertical segregation are dominant in the
sociological literature on organizational discrimination against women.
First, Kanter (1977) documented how women are excluded from informal work
groups when they reach a management position, thereby contributing to women’s failure
as managers. Kanter (1977) argues that managers are often unsure about their job
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performance and are dependent on colleagues in the firm to accomplish their goals.
In particular, managers must build a network to do an effective job, and relationships
are easier to establish when managers share the same background and experiences.
Consequently, firms create segregated job ladders for women, which results in their
slower progress within the firm.
A second explanation suggests that men resist to attempts at gender integration in
order to preserve their privileged position within the firm (Reskin, 1988). By segregat-
ing women into specific occupations with short job ladders, men are free to compete
among themselves for higher paying jobs that offer better career opportunities. This
process is referred to as “social closure”, in which employers discriminate in hiring and
offering promotions, often under the influence of their male employees.
The third way in which women are disadvantaged with respect to men is the process
of “status composition”. That is, jobs with a large number of female incumbents are
devalued in the eyes of the organization. Female-typed jobs are viewed as having lower
skill requirements, which explains their low pay and minimal promotion opportunities.
Although these studies undoubtedly offer a very valuable contribution to the lit-
erature, their reliance on cross-sectional samples precludes an examination of career
changes. By definition, careers take place over time as individuals move between jobs,
and movements from non supervisory to supervisory position is often associated with
wage growth and career development. For this reason, in this chapter, I use a panel
data for my empirical analysis. Another advantage of panel data is the possibility
to account for individual heterogeneity by means of individual specific effects. Cross-
sectional studies not controlling for this heterogeneity may obtain biased results.
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3.3 Data and descriptive statistics
The sample used in this chapter is a sub-sample of the Swiss Labour Force Survey
consisting of individuals who are employed in each year during the period 1999-2003.
I have excluded apprentices because they are not representative for my analysis, and
also self-employees for reasons which will be explained in the next paragraph. We get
a balanced panel data with 927 individuals, of which 484 are men and 443 women,
followed over 5 years.
The list of variables with their definitions is reported in Table 3.1. Table 3.2 re-
ports some descriptive statistics of the data. The two dependent variables used in this
chapter are the natural log of monthly earnings and the level of occupational hierarchy
(denominated as career). The career variable is constructed from a variable which has
originally 5 levels: (1) self-employees , (2) directors, (3) employees with supervisory
position, (4) employees without supervisory position and (5) family members (namely
members of the family who work in the family company, i.e. the wife of a farmer who
helps her husband in the farm, or the son who works with his father). To illustrate the
data and to estimate a binary probit model (see section 3.4), this variable is aggregated
into two levels: high (individuals with supervisory position and directors) and low (in-
cluding individuals in a non supervisory position and family members). Therefore, we
consider in the high level respectively position (2) and (3), and in the low level position
(4) and (5). The category self-employees (1) is not considered in our career variable.
In fact, self-employees do not always have a managing role as directors or employees
with supervisor position, and also do not always have a low hierarchical position. So
it is difficult to identify in which category self-employee belong. Therefore, we decide
to drop out of the sample all individuals with the characteristics of self-employee in at
least one year.
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Considering the independent variables, the marital status variable is measured by
an indicator variable: married takes the value 1 if the person is legally married, and 0
otherwise. If the person is living with a partner but not legally married is considered a
single person. The sample contains information on the type of education. Therefore we
can construct 4 dummy variables for the level of the formation, from the lowest to the
highest level. The 4 categories are: compulsory school, apprenticeship, high school and
university degree. We consider as well the variable foreign, which is equal to 1 if the
individual is not Swiss and equal to 0 otherwise. We know, also, the number of years an
employee is working foe the current employer. We define this variable as occupational
seniority. However, we do not have the exact number of years of actual job experience,
and a proxy variable is used instead. Following the literature, potential work experience
is defined as experienceit = ageit −Eduit − 6, where ageit is corrected for the number
of years of formal schooling Eduit, and the age at which children start school, which
is equal to 6. A problem of using this proxy variable is that, unless individuals work
full-time and continuously, this proxy measures actual work experience with error and
hence application of OLS may give inconsistent estimates. This is because working
life cycles for both males and female may be characterised by frequent interruptions,
especially in the case of female. For the discussion the results of the estimated model,
we have to remember the limits of this variable. In addition, in the analysis is included
the variable part − time, which is equal to 1 if the individual works for a percentage
less than 90%, and 0 otherwise. The children dummy variable is defined equal to 1 if
the individual has children of five years old or less, and 0 otherwise.
Figure 3.1 displays the evolution of the females and males average wages by two
different career levels. We can notice that although the female wages increases during
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the years1, it is always behind the low level of male average wages. In fact the male
average wage in the case of a low level of the career is slightly higher than the female
average wage in the high level.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the average years of occupational seniority in the
two levels of the career (high and low). What is remarkable is that for males and
females the occupational seniority is typically larger in the case of high level of the
job hierarchy. And it is not surprising that the occupational seniority for males, in
both states of career, is always greater than for females. We can also notice that the
occupational seniority for females, in the case of high level of the job hierarchy, has a
large increase during the period 1999-2003.
In Figure 3.3 we display the distribution of the different formation levels in the
sample, by distinguishing between males and females in the two career levels. What
is interesting is that from all women working in a high career level only 15% have a
university degree. The majority, 55%, have an apprenticeship degree.
In Figure 3.4, the ratio of female wages to male wages is reported for the different
educational levels during the five years. If there is perfect equality between female
wages and male wages the ratio will be equal to 1. In our case, in all formation groups,
this ratio is below 1 in all years. The figure shows that among employees with only
compulsory degree, women’s wages are about the 70% of those of men (for the years
2001-2003). This means that the wage differential is about 30%, namely women earn
30% less of men. In the other groups the ratio is around 80-85%. We can conclude that
the higher the formation of an individual, the smaller the wage differential.
Figure 3.5 displays the ratio of female wages to males wages for the two classes of
career (low and high). Also in this case, this ratio is below 1 in all years. It appears
that the highest overall difference between male and female wages is among employees
1Remember that wages are nominal wages. The wage growth rate in real terms can be obtained by
taking into account inflation.
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who have a high career level. In this group women’s wages are about 75% of those of
men. This means that wage gap between males and females with high career level is
about 25%. Instead, for the low level we have a 15% wage gap.
Table 3.3 reports the shares of employees in the sample by educational level. In the
third column it is seen that during the years 1999-2003 about half of the individuals in
the sample have an apprenticeship degree and about a third have a university degree.
Groups corresponding to low levels of education (compulsory school and apprenticeship)
consists of approximately equal shares of men and women (fourth column). Women
dominate the group of employees who have the high school degree as highest education
level; 65 per cent of the employees in this group are women. Probably this is do to
the fact that in this category are also included individuals with teacher’s diploma. The
group of individuals with university degree is dominated by men.
In Table 3.4 are reported the shares of employees by career level. It can be seen
that about 60% of the individuals are in the low hierarchy level and about 50% in the
high level. It appears that about 65 per cent of the employees who have a high career
level are men. The low level of the work hierarchy consist for 57.5% of women.
3.4 The model
In this section I am interested in the impact of individual characteristics on the chance
of receiving a job promotion, and in the evaluation of the gender wage gap at the
different levels of the job career. To conduct this analysis we start by considering a
simple panel model for a wage equation (section 3.4.1). Thereafter, we introduce in the
wage equation a dummy variable which admit two values which are, 1 if the employee
is in a high level of the job hierarchy, and 0 if he/she is in the low level (section 3.4.2).
Finally, we specify the probability for an employee to be in the high level of the job
hierarchy as a Probit model with random effects (section 3.4.3).
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To introduce the models used for the empirical analysis, consider a sample of n
individuals indexed by i (i = 1, ..., n), and let T denote the number of observations
for individual (in our case n = 927 and T = 5). Note that T does not vary across
individuals, therefore the sample is a balanced panel.
3.4.1 Wage equation
A simple panel model of wage determination, which has often been considered in the
empirical literature2, is
yit = x′itβ + αi + wit i = 1, .., n and t = 1, .., T (3.1)
where the dependent variable yit is the logarithmic wage. The k×1 vector of explanatory
variables xit, which are assumed exogenous, includes measures for observed human
capital characteristics, which can be time varying or time invariant. The unobservable
error term contains an individual specific component, αi, which is constant over time,
and an idiosyncratic error term, wit. The individual specific component αi captures
unobserved individual specific skills, such as motivation or ability, while the idiosincratic
error component wit accounts for transitory shocks or luck. We assume further that
E [αi] = E [wit] = 0,
E
[
w2it
]
= σ2w,
E
[
α2i
]
= σ2α, (3.2)
E [witαj ] = 0 for all i, t and j,
E [witwjs] = 0 if t 6= s or i 6= j,
E [αiαj ] = 0 if i 6= j.
2Mincer and Polanchek (1987), Dolton and Makepeace (1986).
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For the T observations of individual i let us now define
$it = αi + wit t = 1, . . . , T, (3.3)
and
$i =
[
$i1 $i2 . . . $iT
]′
. (3.4)
This error structure for $it, is often called an error component model3 with random
effects. Then we have,
V ar($it) = σ2α + σ
2
w, (3.5)
and
Cov($it, $is) = σ2α for t 6= s. (3.6)
The individual specific effect αi introduce a correlation between the observation of the
same individual. For the T observations of individual i, let Ω = E[$i$′i]. Then
Ω =

σ2α + σ
2
w σ
2
α · · · σ2α
σ2α σ
2
α + σ
2
w σ
2
α
...
...
. . . σ2α
σ2α · · · σ2α σ2α + σ2w
 . (3.7)
3Balestra and Nerlove (1966), Matyas and Sevestre (1996).
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Since individuals i and j are independent, the disturbance covariance matrix for the
full sample of nT observations is
V =

Ω 0 · · · 0
0 Ω 0
...
...
. . . 0
0 · · · 0 Ω
 = In ⊗ Ω. (3.8)
3.4.2 Wage equation with career effect
We now extend the panel model (3.1) to account for the effect on wage of the different
levels of career. Consider the dummy variable dit, which can take two values, 1 if the
employee i is in the high level of the job hierarchy at t and 0 if he/she is in the low
level. We write
dit = j, j = 0, 1 (3.9)
where j corresponds to the two admissible states in job hierarchy. The wage equation
is given by,
yit = x′itβj + αi + wit if dit = j, j = 0, 1, i = 1, .., n and t = 1, .., T,
(3.10)
where the vector of the coefficients βj is different in the two states (j = 0 and j = 1),
the same assumptions (3.2) as before apply to the error term in equation (3.10). Thus,
we allow for an effect of career level on the coefficients of the wage regressions. Since x
contains a constant and explanatory variables, this effect may correspond in general to
a shift in the level or in the slope of the wage function. Note that when β0 = β1 we are
in the special case of the equation (3.1). In the next section we introduce the process
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that determines whether the individual is in the high level or in the low level of career
at different dates.
3.4.3 Probit model for career effect
The model for dit is deduced from a latent regression. More specifically, we consider
the following panel model
d∗it = z
′
itγ + it i = 1, .., n and t = 1, .., T (3.11)
where d∗it denotes a latent continuous variable, zit is an observable vector of strictly ex-
ogenous characteristics, γ is a vector of unknown coefficients and it is an unobservable
error. The observable endogenous variables dit are given by:
dit = 1 if d∗it > 0 and = 0 otherwise. (3.12)
The error terms  satisfy a random effects specification:
it = ui + vit (3.13)
where ui is an individual specific effect and vit is a idiosyncratic component. In the
Probit random effects model, the errors ui and vit (i = 1, . . . , n, t = 1, . . . , T ) are
assumed mutually independent and normally distributed with ui ∼ N(0, σ2u) and vit ∼
N(0, σ2v). We allow, however, for correlation between ui and αi, the individual specific
component defined in the wage equation (3.1). This is natural since both ui and αi are
specific effects for individual i.
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From the unobservability of d∗it, it follows that parameters β, σ
2
u and σ
2
v are identified
only up to a multiplicative constant. As identification condition we set σ2v = 1. Thus,
the errors it are normally distibuted independent across individuals and such that:
V ar(it) = σ2v + σ
2
u = 1 + σ
2
u (3.14)
and
Corr(it, is) = ρ =
σ2u
1 + σ2u
, t 6= s. (3.15)
The equicorrelation between the errors of individual i at different dates is originated
by the individual effect ui.
In the panel probit model the probability of an individual i to be in a high level of
job hierarchy at time t is:
P [dit = 1 | zit] = P [d∗it > 0 | zit] = P [it > −z′itβ] = Φ
(
z′itγ√
1 + σ2u
)
, (3.16)
where Φ denotes the c.d.f. of the standard normal distribution. The probability of
promotion at time t is an increasing transformation of the score z
′
itγ√
1+σ2u
. Thus, at each
date t the variable dit follows a standard Probit specification. Note however that the
individual effect ui introduces dependence across observations of the same individual
at different dates (cf. (3.15)).
The wage equation (3.10) and the Probit model for career effect (3.11)-(3.12) define
a panel switching regression model. For the sake of the future reference, we repeat here
the equations,
yit = x′itβj + αi + wit if dit = j, j = 0, 1 (3.17)
dit = 1 if d∗it > 0 and = 0 otherwise (3.18)
d∗it = z
′
itγ + ui + vit (3.19)
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i = 1, .., n and t = 1, ..., T
3.5 Estimation
In this section we discuss the estimation methods for the models introduced in section
3.4.
3.5.1 Random effects estimator
The panel model specified in equation (3.1) does not satisfy the conditions of the
classical regression. In fact, the matrix of variance-covariance is not a diagonal matrix
(cf. (3.7)-(3.8)). In this case the BLUE estimator is the Generalized Least Squares
(GLS) estimator
β˜ =
(
n∑
i=1
x′iΩ
−1xi
)−1 n∑
i=1
x′iΩ
−1yi, (3.20)
where xi is a T × k matrix of explanatory variables for individual i and yi is the vector
of T observations yit for individual i. The T × T matrix Ω is the variance-covariance
matrix defined in equation (3.8).
In our case Ω contains unknown parameters that must be estimated and the GLS
is not feasible. To make GLS estimation feasible, we shall use Ω̂ instead of Ω, where Ω̂
is obtained using some estimators σ̂α and σ̂w. The Feasible Generalized Least Squares4
(FGLS) becomes
β̂ =
(
n∑
i=1
x′iΩ̂
−1xi
)−1 n∑
i=1
x′iΩ̂
−1yi. (3.21)
4Matyas and Sevestre (1996).
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The FGLS estimator β̂ is consistent under the hypothesis of strict exogeneity, that is
E [αi + wit | xi] = 0 ∀i, t (3.22)
which we have assumed in section 3.4.1. If the condition of strict exogeneity is not
satisfied, we must proceed with an IV approach. We will not consider this approach in
this work.
3.5.2 Two-stage estimation of the panel switching regression
The wage equation model with career effect (3.17)-(3.19) can be rewritten as,
yit = ditx′itβ1 + (1− dit)x′itβ0 + αi + wit
= x′it1β1 + x
′
it0β0 + αi + wit, (3.23)
where xit1 = xitdit, xit0 = xit(1 − dit) and dit is defined in (3.17)-(3.19). This is a
switching regression model for panel data.
The natural estimation approach for the specification in equation (3.20) is a Random
Effects estimator as in section 3.5.1. However, the orthogonality condition between the
explanatory variables (xit1, xit0) and the individual error αi is violated, that is
E[αi | xit1, xit0] 6= 0. (3.24)
In fact, the explanatory variables xit1 and xit0 contain the selection variable dit, which
by definition includes the individual error term ui, which is likely correlated with αi.
This endogeneity problem causes in general inconsistency of the random effects estima-
tor.
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To overcome the problem of endogeneity, a two-stage estimation method can be
used. We opt for a the two-stage method, because it gives us estimates that are
consistent and easy to compute5.
A two-stage method was suggested by Heckman (1976) for his labour-supply model.
It was further extended to a wide class of models6 and is widely used in the literature.
The basic idea of the two-stage approach is to first estimate the selection equation for
dit by a Panel Probit method, and then to use these estimates to correct the wage
equation for yit including the expectation of the error term. These two stages are
presented in the following subsections.
Probit model with Random Effects
As shown in Heckman (1981), the parameters of model (3.11)-(3.13) can be estimated
by noting that, conditionally on individual effect ui, the variables dit, t = 1, . . . , T , for
individual i are independent. Their distribution is such that:
P [dit = 1 | zit, ui] = P
[
vit > −z′itγ − ui
]
= Φ
(
z′itγ + ui
)
, (3.25)
(recal that σ2v = 1). The likelihood of the observations for individual i is obtained by
integrating out factor ui:
li(θ) =
∫ { T∏
t=1
Φ(z′itγ + ui)
yit [1− Φ(z′itγ + ui)]1−yit
}
1
σu
φ
(
ui
σu
)
dui (3.26)
5Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) could also be used (see Vella and Verbeek (1999) and Ridder
(1990)), but this approach is computationally more complicated.
6Lee(1976), Amemya (1978, 1979).
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where φ is the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, and θ = (γ, σ2u). The
maximum likelihood estimator is obtained by maximizing the log-likelihood
L(θ) =
n∑
i=1
log li(θ). (3.27)
Pooled OLS with correction term
To derive the correction term, we take the expectation of the wage equation (3.17),
conditional on explanatory variables and get
E[yit | xit, zit, dit] = x′it1β1 + x′it0β0 + E[αi | xit, zit, dit], (3.28)
where we used that E[wit | xit, zit, dit] = 0. To compute E[αi | xit, zit, dit] we distinguish
two cases, when dit = 1 (high level of the job hierarchy) and dit = 0 (low level of the
job hierarchy). Thus, we need to evaluate the expectation for the individual error term
in the two states, namely,
E[αi | xit, zit, dit = 1] = E[αi | it > −z′itγ]
= E
[
E[αi | it] | it > −z′itγ
]
, (3.29)
and
E[αi | xit, zit, dit = 0] = E[αi | ui + vit < −z′itγ]
= E
[
E[αi | ui + vit] | ui + vit < −z′itγ
]
, (3.30)
where conditioning on zit, xit in the right hand side of (3.29) and (3.30) is omitted for
the purposes of exposition. Using it = ui+vit, the joint distribution of the error terms
is  αi
it
 ∼ N
 0
0
 ,
 σ2α σαu
σαu 1 + σ2u
 , (3.31)
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where σαu is the correlation between αi and ui. Now, we can evaluate the two expec-
tations in (3.29) and (3.30) knowing that, from joint normality,
E[αi | it] = σαu1 + σ2u
it. (3.32)
Moreover from the standard results for the Probit model (see Maddala, 1999) and
V (it) = 1 + σ2u we have
E[it | it > −z′itγ] =
√
1 + σ2u
φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
Φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
) , (3.33)
and
E[it | it < −z′itγ] = −
√
1 + σ2u
φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
1− Φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
) , (3.34)
where φ and Φ are the density function and the cumulative distribution function of the
standard normal, respectively. From equations (3.29) and (3.30) follows that
E (αi | xit, zit, dit = 1) = σαu1 + σ2u
√
1 + σ2u
φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
Φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
=
σαu√
1 + σ2u
φ(Θit)
Φ(Θit)
= δ
φ(Θit)
Φ(Θit)
= δζit1, (3.35)
and
E (αi | xit, zit, dit = 0) = − σαu1 + σ2u
√
1 + σ2u
φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
1− Φ
(
z′itγ√
1+σ2u
)
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= − σαu√
1 + σ2u
φ(Θit)
1− Φ(Θit) = −δ
φ(Θit)
1− Φ(Θit) = δζit0,
(3.36)
If γ and σ2u were known, the variables ζit0 and ζit1 could be constructed. Then,
from (3.35) we have
E[yit | xit, zit, dit] = x′it1β1 + x′it0β0 + δ[ζit1dit + ζit0(1− dit)]. (3.37)
In practice γ and σ2u are unknown, but can be consistently estimated by the panel
Probit regression. Thus, the second step of the two-stage procedure is to estimate the
pooled OLS regression
yit = x′it1β1 + x
′
it0β0 + δ[ζ̂it1dit + ζ̂it0(1− dit)] + error, (3.38)
where ζ̂it1 and ζ̂it0 are obtained using the panel Probit estimates of the first step. This
gives us consistent estimates of β1, β0 and δ. From the estimation of δ we get also
consistent estimates of the covariance term σαu.
3.6 Gender wag gap
The estimates from the panel switching regression model are used to evaluate how the
gender wage differential changes over the different career phases. To evaluate this, we
use the decomposition of the wage gap suggested by Oaxaca (1973). We distinguish
the wage gap for the two states of career, high level and low level. First we define the
expected wage for males and females at different dates and for the two states, and then
we construct the wage gap taking the difference between male and female expected
wages.
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For males the expected average wage in the high career level is defined as follows,
E[yit | xit, dit = 1] = x′itβm + E[αi | xit, zit, dit = 1]
= x′itβm + δm
φ
(
z′itγm√
1+σ2um
)
Φ
(
z′itγm√
1+σ2um
) , (3.39)
and for females as
E[yit | xit, dit = 1] = x′itβf + E[αi | xit, zit, dit = 1]
= x′itβf + δf
φ
(
z′itγf√
1+σ2uf
)
Φ
(
z′itγf√
1+σ2uf
) , (3.40)
where the indices m and f denote parameters for the subsample of males and females
respectively. In the case of low career level, the equations are,
E[yit | xit, dit = 0] = x′itβm − δm
φ
(
z′itγm√
1+σ2um
)
1− Φ
(
z′itγm√
1+σ2um
) , (3.41)
E[yit | xit, dit = 0] = x′itβf − δf
φ
(
z′itγf√
1+σ2uf
)
1− Φ
(
z′itγf√
1+σ2uf
) . (3.42)
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We define the (unexplained) wage gap for the two states of career j = 0, 1 at each
period t as:
∆1,t = X
′
tf
(
β̂m − β̂f
)
+ δ̂m
φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂m√
1+σ̂2um
)
Φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂m√
1+σ̂2um
) − δ̂f φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂f√
1+σ̂2uf
)
Φ
(
Z
′
itf γ̂f√
1+σ̂2uf
) , (3.43)
∆0,t = X
′
tf
(
β̂m − β̂f
)
− δ̂m
φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂m√
1+σ̂2um
)
1− Φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂m√
1+σ̂2um
) + δ̂f φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂f√
1+σ̂2uf
)
1− Φ
(
Z
′
tf γ̂f√
1+σ̂2uf
) , (3.44)
where Xtf and Ztf are the vectors of sample means of explanatory variables at period
t for females, β̂m and β̂f are estimated coefficients from the male and female panel
switching regression, respectively.
Similarly γ̂m, σ̂2um, γ̂f , σ̂
2
uf are the estimate from panel Probit model for males and
females, respectively. Note that we have used females as reference group.
The difference ∆j,t is divided into two parts. The first part, X
′
tf
(
β̂m − β̂f
)
, is the
wage gap which cannot be explained by differences in productivity. The second part is
due to the correction for the career selection.
3.7 Estimation results
In this section I present the estimation results.
In Table 3.5 are reported the results for the estimation of the panel model (3.1) with
random effects, where the dependent variable is the natural log of monthly earnings,
and the independent variables are marital status, level of education, the foreign dummy,
work experience, occupational seniority, part-time dummy and small children dummy.
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The first and second columns of the table report the estimates for males, the third and
fourth columns for females.
The variablemarried is significant for both males and females, but while for women
the impact is negative, for men it is positive. For women, being married reduces
the monthly earnings by 20%, whereas earnings are increased for men by 5%. The
dummy variables corresponding to the different levels of formation are all significant. As
expected, the estimated coefficients are positive and increasing as the level of educations
increases, for both males and females. In particular, for women having a high formation
increases the monthly salary of 41%, instead for men this effect is less strong, about 30%.
Let us consider the variables experience and occupational seniority. For women, they
are both significant, with a quadratic specification implying a positive effect, and the
experience has an higher impact (0.037) than the occupational seniority (0.015). For
males, the occupational seniority is not significant, while the coefficient of experience
(0.048) is larger than for women. As expected, the part − time variable is significant
and negative for both males and females, with a value of −0.34556 and −0.48019,
respectively. The variable children is significant only for women and has also a negative
impact, with a value of −0.306642. Being married, having children and working part-
time are all characteristics that have a negative impact on the women’s wage.
Table 3.6 shows the estimation results for a panel model with random effects, where
we control for vertical segregation by inserting the variable career among the regressors.
The introduction of the career dummy variable doesn’t modify the estimation results.
In fact we have no significant change with respect to Table 3.5. The career dummy
variable is significant and positive for both males and females, with a value of 0.029269
and 0.058271, respectively.
The estimates presented in Table 3.6 likely suffer from an endogeneity problem,
since the career variable is correlated with the individual specific effect (see discussion
in section 3.5.2). To correct for endogeneity we consider the dummy variable career
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as an endogenous variable determined by a Probit selection equation, and adopt the
two-stage estimation approach.
In Table 3.7 are presented the estimation results for the Probit model with random
effect. The first and second columns report the estimates for males, the third and
fourth columns for females. We have also computed the probability for an individual,
with average characteristics, to be in the high level of the job hierarchy for the years
1999-2003. In Table 3.8 are reported the probabilities for males and females during the
5 years. We have found that for men it is more likely to be in the high career level than
for women. In fact this probability is about 55% for the 5 years, instead for women is
about 30%.
In Tables 3.9 and 3.10 we present the results for the marginal effects7 and their stan-
dard errors8. In Table 3.9 the marginal effects are computed for both males and females
at the average value of characteristics in the corresponding sample. To distinguish the
impact of different coefficients and average characteristics for males and females, in
Table 3.10 the marginal effects for females are computed at the male average, and vice
versa.
Considering the estimated coefficients of dummy variables of formation (table 3.7),
they are significant and increasing as the levels of formation increases. This implies
that, the higher is the level of education, the larger is the probability to be in the high
7The marginal effects for the variables formationi, i = 2, . . . , 4, are computed considering that the
variables are discrete and exclusive of each others. For example, consider the variable formation2. Its
marginal effect is defined as follow:
α = P [d = 1 | form2 = 1, form3 = 0, form4 = 0, Z¯]− P [d = 1 | form2 = 0, form3 = 0, form4 = 0, Z¯]
where Z¯ denotes the average in the sample for all other characteristics excluding formation. This
marginal effect is the difference in the probability of being in the high career level between one individual
with apprenticeship formation and one with no scholar formation, all other variables being at the average
value in the sample.
8Detailed explanations on the computation of the standard errors for the marginal effects are given
in the Appendix.
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level of the job hierarchy. To be more accurate in the evaluation of the impact of the
formation variables on the chance of being in the high career level, we can look at the
marginal effects (Table 3.9). For example the probability to be in the high career level
increases of about 67% if a men has a university degree. For women this probability
is of 20%. Note that in general the estimated coefficients and the marginal effects of
formation for women are significantly smaller than for men, meaning that the impact
of education levels on the chances of promotion is less important for women.
Let us now consider the impact of occupational seniority. The estimated coefficients
(Table 3.7) and the marginal effects (Table 3.8) are similar for males and females and
imply a positive effect. Thus, occupational seniority seems to be important to get job
promotions for males and females to a similar extent. At the contrary, experience is
not significant for women.
We also find that the variable foreign is not significant, for both men and women.
The part− time variable is negative and significant for both men and women, even if
its marginal effect doubles for men (Table 3.9). The variable children is not significant
for females, but significant for males. I expected a negative and significant effect for
women, explaining the smaller chance for women to be promoted, but this is not the
case. Probably this has to do with the fact that only working women are considered in
the sample.
Considering now the marginal effects for women computed using the mean charac-
teristics of males (Table 3.10), we note that the values are not very different from the
ones computed with female mean, except for the variables formation. In particular
this means that the difference in the marginal effects between females and males have
to be imputed mostly to difference in the coefficients.
In Table 3.11 are reported the results for the panel switching regression. In the
wage equation we introduce as independent variable, besides the explanatory factors
considered above, a correction term. The variable correction is our δ in equations (3.35)
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and (3.36). This variable is significant for both males and females, with a negative and
positive sign respectively9.
Note that only the constant term has a coefficient which is different for the two
states of career, high and low. Instead we constrained the model (3.10) to have the
same coefficients in j = 0 and j = 1 for all regressors except the constant. We tried also
to estimate the wage equation allowing for different values of all coefficients in j = 0
and j = 1, but the estimates do not appear different.
Considering the constant term, it is significant and positive for both high and low
career levels, and for males and females. As expected, we can notice that for males
the value of the constant term is higher in the case of high level of career than for
the low level. This means that men in the high level of the job hierarchy will earn a
higher wage compared men in the low level, all other characteristics being equal. For
females the result is different, namely the constant term is higher in the case of low
career. We can argue that in the case of low career level we have a higher ”starting“
wage than in the high career level. More precisely, the constant in the wage equation
can be interpreted as the wage rate of an individual with the lowest level of education,
zero experience and zero seniority (as well as zero for the other dummies). Thus, the
data suggest that a woman with low qualifications will earn a lower wage if, for some
reasons, she is employed in a position in high levels of the occupational hierarchy. Of
corse, this will not imply that a women in the high career level has always a lower wage
than in the case of low career level. In fact the individual characteristics (formation,
experience, seniority) will affect the wage allowing for higher wages.
The variable married has a positive impact for men (about 5%) and a negative
impact for women (about -12%). Instead, the variable formation is increasing for the
three levels of education, for both males and females. The estimated coefficient of the
9Note that the standard errors, displayed in the second and forth column of the table, are not correct.
This is because they do not account for the fact that the correction variable has been estimated.
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experience variable is smaller for males than for females. In particular, for women an
additional year of experience increases the monthly earnings by 3.5%, while for men
only by 2.5%. For the occupational seniority variable we have the same trend. For
females, an additional year of seniority increases the wage by 4.5%. For men the value
is by 4%. As we expected, the variable part− time is negative for males and females.
The variable children has a negative impact in the females case and a positive impact
if the individual is a man, but in this case the variable is not significant.
Making a comparison between the panel model with random effects and career
variable (Table 3.6) and the panel switching regression (Table 3.11) we can observe
that the estimation results are rather different in size, but not in sign. For example,
for the formation dummy variables, for the three dummy, the impact is larger in
the panel switching regression. For instance, for females having a compulsory school
degree increases the wage by about 20% in the first estimation, and by about 50% in the
switching regression. We can notice that the values doubled from the first to the second
estimation. This is true for both males and female. Only for the variable experience
the estimated coefficients are almost of the same magnitude in the two estimations and
for both males and females.
In Table 3.12 are reported the wage gap in the case of high or low career level, for
the period 1999-2003. We can notice that the wage gap is always bigger in the case
of low job hierarchy than in the high level. The gap in the case of high career level
is between 21% to 25%, in the case of low level between 32% to 35%. Note that this
result is opposite than the finding illustrated in Figure 3.5, where the female-to-male
wage ratio is lower in the high level of occupational hierarchy. The difference between
the two results is explained by the fact that the wage gaps computed in Table 3.12
accounts for individual characteristics, that is, they are the ”unexplained“ gaps. Thus,
although in the high level of career the numerical difference between male and female
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wages is higher, individual characteristics explain part of this gap, and the unexplained
wage gap is smaller than in the low level of career.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have investigated the gender wage differential and the gender promo-
tion chance using data of the Swiss Labour Force Survey. The data are collected by
the Swiss federal statistical office, covering the period 1999-2003.
The wage equation and the chance to be in the high level of the job hierarchy
are analysed separately for males and females, to determine the impact of individuals’
characteristics on the monthly earnings and to investigate whether same characteristics
provide similar chances of career.
Unequal career advancement is an important part of women’s unequal treatment
in the labour market. Theoretical models frequently attribute this phenomenon to
females shorter horizon in market work, because of comparative advantages in outside
opportunities. For example, Lazear and Rose (1990) suggest that to be promoted, a
woman must be somewhat better than a man in order to compensate her higher ex-
ante probability of departure and the social investment loss. The more likely she is to
leave (relative to male), the larger must be the compensating ability differential. Our
empirical results show, however, that only a part of the unequal gender distribution
in job position is explained by discontinuous labour market experience. In fact the
endowment characteristics, such as the schooling formation, have an important effect
on the chance to be in the high level of the job hierarchy.
From the descriptive analysis it is seen that men have best chances of career. In
fact, the percentage of women in the high level of the job hierarchy is relatively small
(30%). Furthermore observing the evolution of the average wage, it can be noticed that
the gap between males and females is very high. While men reach almost an average
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level of 8’000 SFr, in the case of high career level, women achieve only a level of 6’000
SFr.
From the estimation of the wage equation we have found that wages in both gender
categories increase with formation, with stronger education effects for females. Also
the occupational seniority variable plays a more important role in the case women. In
fact, this variable double in female estimates. For the experience, the opposite holds;
it is for men that this variable has a much stronger effect. The married and children
variables play also an important role. In fact, for women being married and having
children, has a significant and negative impact on the wage. While for men, only the
married variable is significant and the impact is positive.
In the probit estimation, formation and occupational seniority appear to be the
most important single factors to explain the different chances in the career. An others
variable that have also an important influence is part− time. In both gender cases the
impact is negative and, especially for men, part−time has a large negative effect on the
chance to be in the high job hierarchy. What is also surprising is the non significance
of the children and married variables in the case of females.
The fact that occupational seniority and working part-time have such strong impact
on the promotion chance suggests that for women will be difficult to overcome the fact
to be often confined to dead-end jobs.
Three substantive conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. First, the social
characteristics, such as the marital status and the number of children, have a different
impact on men and women. For women being married and having children is disad-
vantageous, instead for men is almost favourable.
Second, our research suggests that for women it is more important to have a high
occupational seniority than to have a lot of years of experience, to increase the prob-
ability to be in high level of the career or to observe raise in the wage. Instead for
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men the opposite holds. This can be explained by several empirical works10, which
generally associate a raise in the wage, with a job change within firm, but not always
with a promotion.
Finally, also the formation dummy variable plays an important role especially for
females. A raise in the formation is always associated with an increase in the wage and
in the probability to be in the high level of the job hierarchy. This shows how much is
important, for women, to have a high formation level.
10For example, Carmichael (1983)
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Variable Name Definition
Dependent Variables
Log Earnings The natural log of monthly earnings
Career 1 if he/she is in the high level of occupational hierarchy,
0 otherwise
Independent Variables
Married 1 if he/she is married, 0 otherwise
Formation 1 1 if the highest achieved level of study is compulsory schooling,
0 otherwise
Formation 2 1 if the highest achieved level of study is apprenticeship,
0 otherwise
Formation 3 1 if the highest achieved level of study is high school,
0 otherwise
Formation 4 1 if the highest achieved level of study is university degree,
0 otherwise
Foreign 1 if he/she is a foreigner, 0 otherwise
Experience Number of years of prior work experience
Experience squared Work experience squared
Occupational seniority Number of years worked for the current employers
Occupational seniority squared Occupational seniority squared
Part-time 1 if he/she workes less than 90%, 0 otherwise
Child ≤5 years 1 if he/she has children of 5 years old or less, 0 otherwise
Table 3.1: Variables Definitions
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of females and males average wages by career level
The figure reports the evolution of the females and males average wages. The average wage is defined
for the two levels of career: high position (directors) and low position (individuals in a non supervisory
position).
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of females and males average years of occupational
seniority by career level
The figure reports the evolution of females and males average years of occupational seniority. Note
that the average wage is defined for two levels of career: high position (directors and individuals with
supervisory position) and low position (individuals in a non supervisory position).
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Figure 3.3: Percentage of females and males in different formation level by
career level
The figure reports the percentage of females and males in different formation level by career level. The
first two columns refer to males (high and low career level, respectively) and the second two to females.
83
Years
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
l
l
l
l
l
Compulsory School
Apprenticeship
High School
University
Figure 3.4: Ratio of female wages to male wages, by educational level
The figure reports the ratio of female wages to male wages by educational level in Switzerland for the
years 1999-2003.
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Figure 3.5: Ratio of female wages to male wages, by career level
The figure reports the ratio of female wages to male wages by career level in Switzerland for the years
1999-2003.
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Male Female
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Wage Monthly 5775.892 2290.366 3408.642 2057.719
Married 0.6472532 - 0.464108 -
Formation1 0.0764147 - 0.081716 -
Formation2 0.4688145 - 0.561625 -
Formation3 0.0904585 - 0.186005 -
Formation4 0.3643123 - 0.170655 -
Foreign 0.1606774 - 0.085327 -
Experience 21.63982 10.10032 23.18104 10.88289
Experience squared 570.2561 497.0925 655.7445 540.2948
Occupational seniority 10.70441 9.561288 8.926122 8.5197
Occupational seniority squared 205.9649 334.1595 152.2282 275.7192
Part-time 0.0574143 - 0.564786 -
Children < 5 years 0.2011565 - 0.117833 -
Number of observations 2420 2215
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics by gender
Educational level Men Women Both Share of
n = 484 n = 443 n = 927 women
(%) (%) (%) (%)
Compulsory School 7.6 8.2 7.9 49.5
Apprenticeship 46.9 56.2 51.3 52.3
High School 9.0 18.6 13.6 65.3
University 36.4 17.1 27.2 30.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 47.8
Table 3.3: The share of employees in the sample, by educational level
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Career level Men Women Both Share of
n = 484 n = 443 n = 927 women
(%) (%) (%) (%)
High 53.3 30.9 42.6 34.7
Low 46.7 69.1 57.4 57.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 47.8
Table 3.4: The share of employees in the sample, by career level
Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant term 7.786164** 0.0581161 7.631576** 0.106037
Married 0.0485276** 0.0197155 -0.220826** 0.036910
Formation2 0.1409613** 0.0332014 0.210335** 0.062473
Formation3 0.1581395** 0.0389132 0.279298** 0.068824
Formation4 0.3313344** 0.0356583 0.419415** 0.072042
Foreign -0.1176634** 0.0333989 0.091177 0.073418
Experience 0.0486955** 0.0042652 0.037417** 0.007056
Experience squared -0.0007616** 0.0000887 -0.000741** 0.000136
Occupational seniority -0.0017758 0.0022332 0.015058** 0.004911
Occupational seniority squared 0.0000621 0.0000703 -0.000396** 0.000162
Part-time -0.3455685** 0.0279431 -0.480195** 0.031508
Children < 5 years 0.0236556 0.0171646 -0.306642** 0.043174
σu 0.26775685 0.420079
σw 0.15678049 0.330879
ρ 0.74468539 0.617129
N 2206 2029
* Values significant at 5%, ** values significant at 1%
Table 3.5: Panel model with random effects
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly earnings. The estimation is made for the two
samples of males and females separately.
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant term 7.788972** 0.057671 7.620852** 0.105273
Career 0.029269** 0.012263 0.058271** 0.024352
Married 0.046012** 0.019675 -0.222661** 0.036712
Formation2 0.137321** 0.033182 0.203025** 0.062274
Formation3 0.154661** 0.038922 0.272788** 0.068614
Formation4 0.326943** 0.035688 0.410123** 0.071903
Foreign -0.116262** 0.032931 0.092863 0.072608
Experience 0.047773** 0.004244 0.037728** 0.007006
Experience squared -0.000751** 0.000081 -0.00075** 0.000135
Occupational seniority -0.001962 0.002234 0.014443** 0.004905
Occupational seniority squared 0.000065 0.000071 -0.000371** 0.000161
Part-time -0.345162** 0.027981 -0.477832** 0.031548
Children < 5 years 0.026131 0.017212 -0.30463** 0.043145
σu 0.260422 0.411194
σw 0.156825 0.330976
ρ 0.733871 0.606837
N 2206 2029
* Values significant at 5%, ** values significant at 1%
Table 3.6: Panel model with random effects and career variable
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly earnings. We control for vertical segregation by
introducing the variable career among the regressors.
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant term -3.12058** 0.526108 -1.30477** 0.428991
Married 0.606469** 0.185818 0.125583 0.147113
Formation2 1.110444** 0.32075 0.75939** 0.271404
Formation3 1.373995** 0.38618 0.867423** 0.30141
Formation4 1.972684** 0.3441 1.181876** 0.307426
Foreign 0.034704 0.260838 -0.34047 0.283771
Experience 0.122121** 0.037594 -0.02025 0.029147
Experience squared -0.00244** 0.000778 0.000263 0.000585
Occupational seniority 0.056039** 0.021073 0.059265** 0.021282
Occupational seniority squared -0.00069 0.000659 -0.00195** 0.0007
Part-time -0.9258** 0.292536 -0.55057** 0.133155
Children < 5 years -0.37655* 0.172065 -0.2545 0.19813
σu 1.878373 0.103947 1.426627 0.09343
ρ 0.779166 0.019044 0.670539 0.028936
N 2421 2215
* Values significant at 5%, ** values significant at 1%
Table 3.7: Probit Model with Random Effects
The dependent variable in the probit model takes the value of 1 if the individual i in year t is in the
high level of job hierarchy, 0 otherwise.
Probability 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Males 0.5222 0.5315 0.5449 0.5497 0.5606
Females 0.3052 0.3049 0.3053 0.3057 0.3302
Table 3.8: Probability of an individual to be in a high level of the job hierarchy
during the period 1999-2003
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Males Females
Variables dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Married 0.2362223 0.0711000 0.0338108 0.0398100
Formation2 0.3610290 0.0208315 0.0513365 0.0101136
Formation3 0.4653261 0.0216109 0.0809212 0.0112750
Formation4 0.6703305 0.0221590 0.1818415 0.0079938
Foreign 0.0134670 0.1009300 -0.0797412 0.0573800
Experience 0.0475192 0.0146500 -0.0054296 0.0078300
Experience squared -0.0009478 0.0003000 0.0000706 0.0001600
Occupational seniority 0.0218056 0.0082100 0.0158945 0.0057700
Occupational seniority squared -0.0002689 0.0002600 -0.0005224 0.0001900
Part-time -0.3508453 0.0956900 -0.1518085 0.0386200
Children < 5 years -0.1484352 0.0678700 -0.0622877 0.0440200
Table 3.9: Marginal effects of the probit model for males and females
Males with mean of Females with mean of
females males
Variables dy/dx Std. Err dy/dx Std. Err
Married 0.2069610 0.0129427 0.0430493 0.0446069
Formation2 0.2152727 0.0609769 0.2178028 0.0878911
Formation3 0.3063246 0.0650712 0.2537385 0.0921502
Formation4 0.5404756 0.0687397 0.3695426 0.082297
Foreign 0.0118430 0.0038131 -0.1167116 0.0956717
Experience 0.0416745 0.0021781 -0.0069400 0.0102073
Experience squared -0.0008312 0.0000447 0.0000902 0.0001918
Occupational seniority 0.0191236 0.0012025 0.0203160 0.0083427
Occupational seniority squared -0.0002358 0.0000175 -0.0006678 0.0002745
Part-time -0.3159349 0.0209401 -0.1887331 0.0606227
Children < 5 years -0.1284995 0.0083486 -0.0872408 0.0676057
Table 3.10: Marginal effects of the probit model for males and females with
different means
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Males Females
Variables Est. Std. Err. Est. Std. Err.
Constant for high livel 7.972446** 0.044585 6.090929** 0.535943
Constant for low level 7.85675** 0.044135 8.176573** 0.195675
Married 0.0468832** 0.016101 -0.12856** 0.032813
Formation2 0.1691681** 0.02734 0.4954** 0.101536
Formation3 0.3198541** 0.03329 0.698473** 0.116215
Formation4 0.4827371** 0.028212 1.092858** 0.161025
Foreign -0.0917396** 0.019586 -0.1183 0.066375
Experience 0.0285255** 0.00316 0.036932** 0.005727
Experience squared -0.0004348** 0.000064 -0.00097** 0.000106
Occupational seniority 0.0039634** 0.002125 0.045075** 0.008943
Occupational seniority squared -0.0000971 0.000063 -0.00109** 0.000286
Part-time -0.5409551 0.028605** -0.9345** 0.083445
Children < 5 years 0.0283529 0.018799 -0.47257** 0.054617
Correction -0.0073226** 0.003624 1.358621** 0.430972
N 2206 2029
* Values significant at 5%, ** values significant at 1%
Table 3.11: Panel switching regression for vertical segregation
The dependent variable is the natural log of monthly earnings.We have two different constants, the
first for the high level of job hierarchy, the second for the low level.
GAP 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
High 0.2177 0.2378 0.2423 0.2218 0.2574
Low 0.3247 0.3159 0.3371 0.3546 0.3590
Table 3.12: Wage gap for the two career levels
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Chapter 4
Conclusions
During the last years, occupational segregation has re-gained popularity in the analysis
of gender relations at work. This interest has developed two directions. First, interest
in measuring the level of occupational segregation by gender over time, using various
indices of segregation. And second, the focus on the causes and the consequences of the
occupational segregation by gender. From this starting point, this thesis has addressed
several issues related to the development of models to detect and measure occupational
segregation and gender wage gap.
In the main part of the thesis a major focus was given on the occupational segre-
gation. More precisely, in Chapter 2have considered the horizontal occupational segre-
gation, which occurs when there is a concentration of women or men in a given field or
occupation. By following the approach introduced by Hirsch (1995) and Hansen and
Wahlberg (2000), a new explanatory variable FEM1 was included in the wage equa-
tion, which allow to control for occupational segregation. However, this new variable
can cause a problem of endogeneity. In fact, it is difficult to ensure that there is no
correlation between the density of females in an occupation and the error term of the
1This variable measures the percentage of females in an occupational specification.
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wage equation. To overcome this problem, an ordered probit model was considered, in
which the dependent variable admits three values (0, for male dominated occupations, 1
for intermediate occupations and 2 for female dominated occupations). Separate wage
regressions are specified for each value of the discrete variable. I have estimated this
model with a version of Heckman two step approach. Two main results can be drawn
from this analysis. First, in accordance with previous studies, I have found that a high
concentration of female workers in an occupation in Switzerland has a negative effect
on male and female estimated wages. This confirms the hypothesis of wage penalty
for working in female dominated occupations. Second, I have found that the smallest
gender wage gap occurs in male dominated occupations.
In chapter 3, I have considered the vertical occupational segregation, that occurs
when there is a concentration of women and men in a given level of responsibility.
To study this problematic, we have proposed a general linear model where we have
introduced a dummy variable for being in the high level of the job hierarchy, or in the
low level. The estimation methodology was a version of Heckman two step procedure.
The main results from the analysis of this model are the following. First, the level
of formation has a relevant impact on the vertical segregation, especially for women,
where a higher formation increases the probability to be in the high level of the job
hierarchy. Second, instead, for women being married or having children decreases the
probability to be in the high level of the job hierarchy. For men, the opposite holds.
Finally, the seniority plays also an important role (more than the experience), but this
only in the female case.
The limitations of these models concern primarily the problem of sample selection
and of endogeneity. Regarding sample selection, in both chapters 2 and 3, we don’t
consider the individual choice to enter or not in the job market, or the choice between
being a self-employee or an employee. In Chapter 2, we have a limitation on the data.
The survey gives information only on individuals who are working. We don’t have
93
any information on individuals who decide not to enter in the job market. At the
contrary, in principle Chapter 3 allows for a more sophisticated model. The survey,
in fact, contains information on individuals who are working and not, and who are
self-employee and not.
The decision to disregard these other layers of individual choice is motivated by the
desire to focus on the simplest specification to highlight the main issues.
Concerning the endogeneity, besides the problem considered for the two variables
FEM and career, we have neglected the endogeneity of some others variable such as
experience. In fact, in our thesis, this variable is not the real experience of an individual
(namely the real number of years spent in the job market), but it has been constructed
from other variables. Especially for women, this is a limitation on the results. In fact,
frequently for females this variable was not significant. To overcome this limitation, an
instrumental variable approach could be used.
The extension of the methods presented in this thesis to carefully account for the
endogeneity and sample selection issues is left for future research. Another interesting
direction of research is to apply the model of Chapter 3 in a dynamic setting, to study
the different chances of career promotion of women and men.
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Appendix A
Computation of the Standard
Error
In our model we consider 11 exogenous variables, where 8 are continuous and 3 are
discrete variables (namely formation2, formation3 and formation4).
The vector of the exogenous variables is defined as follow (the individual and the
period indices are suppressed here and in the following to simplify the exposition):
[
X ′ z1 z2 z3
]
=
[
X ′ Z ′
]
(A.1)
where z1, z2 and z3 are the three discrete variables and X ′ = ( x1 . . . x8 ) the vector
of continuous variables. The corresponding regression coefficients are denoted
θ′ =
[
β′ δ1 δ2 δ3
]
=
[
β′ δ′
]
(A.2)
where δ1, δ2 and δ3 are the parameters for the discrete variables and β is the 8 × 1
vector of coefficients for the continuous variables.
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The marginal effects for the continuous variables xj are given by
γj(θ) =
∂[P (d = 1 | X,Z, u = 0)]
∂xj
=
∂Φ(X ′β + δ1z1 + δ2z2 + δ3z3)
∂xj
= φ(ζ)βj , j = 1, . . . , 8 (A.3)
where u is the individual specific effect and ζ: = X ′β + δ1z1 + δ2z2 + δ3z3. Considering
that the marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the variables, we can rewrite
the expression (3.12) as,
γj(θ) = φ(X¯ ′β + δz¯1 + δz¯2 + δz¯3)βj = φ(ζ¯)βj . (A.4)
The marginal effects for the discrete variables z1, z2, z3 are
α(θ) =

Φ(X¯ ′β + δ1)− Φ(X¯ ′β)
Φ(X¯ ′β + δ2)− Φ(X¯ ′β)
Φ(X¯ ′β + δ3)− Φ(X¯ ′β)
 =

α1(θ)
α2(θ)
α3(θ)
 . (A.5)
Stacking the marginal effects of the continuous and discrete variable we get
g (θ) =
 γ (θ)
α (θ)
 . (A.6)
The associated covariance matrix of the estimated marginal effects can be computed
using the Delta-Method. The basic idea is that the estimated marginal effects g
(
θˆ
)
are a non-linear transformations of the vector θˆ of estimated parameters. Since the
(asymptotic) variance-covariance matrix of θˆ is known, we can obtain the (asymptotic)
variance-covariance matrix of g
(
θˆ
)
by a first-order Taylor series approximation of
function g (θ).
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We get
AsV ar(gˆ) = GV G′, (A.7)
where V = AsV ar(θˆ) and G = ∂g∂θ′ . The matrix of derivatives is defined as follow,
G =
 ∂γ∂β′ ∂γ∂δ′
∂α
∂β′
∂α
∂δ′
 ,
where,
∂γ
∂β′
= φ(ζ)I − φ(ζ)ζβ̂X ′ (A.8)
∂α
∂δ′
=

∂α1
∂δ1
0 0
0 ∂α2∂δ2 0
0 0 ∂α3∂δ3
 , ∂α∂δi = φ(X ′β + δi), i = 1, 2, 3 (A.9)
∂α
∂β′
=

∂α1
∂β′
∂α2
∂β′
∂α2
∂β′
 , ∂αi∂β′ = [φ(X ′β + δi)− φ(X ′β)]X ′, i = 1, 2, 3 (A.10)
∂γ
∂δ′
=
[
∂γ
∂δ1
∂γ
∂δ2
∂γ
∂δ3
]
,
∂γ
∂δi
= −φ(ζ)ζziβ, i = 1, 2, 3. (A.11)
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